借助巴拿赫空间中的三重定点研究寡头垄断市场的均衡问题

IF 1.1 Q3 ECONOMICS Econometrics Pub Date : 2024-06-17 DOI:10.3390/econometrics12020018
Atanas Ilchev, Vanya Ivanova, Hristina Kulina, Polina Yaneva, Boyan Zlatanov
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在这项研究中,我们基于统计数据,借助响应函数而非报酬最大化来探索寡头垄断市场的均衡性和稳定性。为此,我们将耦合定点的概念扩展到三重定点。我们提出了一个新模型,该模型可引出广义三重固定点。我们提出了广义三重固定点模型在研究由三个主要竞争者主导的寡头垄断市场均衡时的可能应用。最大化三个参与者报酬函数的任务由响应函数的广义三重固定点概念进行修改。只要市场价格函数和三个参与者的成本函数是可微分的,所提出的广义响应函数三倍定点模型就等同于库诺报酬最大化。此外,我们还证明了收缩条件与报酬最大化中的二阶约束相对应。此外,与市场均衡可能不稳定的报酬最大化模型相比,我们所考虑的模型是稳定的,因为它确保了连续生产过程的稳定性。经典的报酬函数最大化技术在应用中可能存在的一个缺陷是,市场中的价格函数可能并不为人所知,对它的任何近似都可能导致任务的求解与市场产生的任务不同。我们使用保加利亚啤酒市场的经验数据来说明所创建的模型。在不了解价格函数、成本函数或对特定市场的目标的情况下,统计数据提供了有关参与者如何反应的公平信息。我们根据真实数据及其近似值分别提出了两个模型。这两个模型虽然不同,但在时间和市场均衡的稳定性方面表现出相似的行为。因此,响应函数和三重固定点的概念似乎为寡头垄断市场中的市场过程建模提供了一种合理的方法,即在寻找市场是否已达到均衡以及这种均衡在时间上是否唯一和稳定时可以使用这种方法。
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Investigation of Equilibrium in Oligopoly Markets with the Help of Tripled Fixed Points in Banach Spaces
In the study we explore an oligopoly market for equilibrium and stability based on statistical data with the help of response functions rather than payoff maximization. To achieve this, we extend the concept of coupled fixed points to triple fixed points. We propose a new model that leads to generalized triple fixed points. We present a possible application of the generalized tripled fixed point model to the study of market equilibrium in an oligopolistic market dominated by three major competitors. The task of maximizing the payout functions of the three players is modified by the concept of generalized tripled fixed points of response functions. The presented model for generalized tripled fixed points of response functions is equivalent to Cournot payoff maximization, provided that the market price function and the three players’ cost functions are differentiable. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the contractive condition corresponds to the second-order constraints in payoff maximization. Moreover, the model under consideration is stable in the sense that it ensures the stability of the consecutive production process, as opposed to the payoff maximization model with which the market equilibrium may not be stable. A possible gap in the applications of the classical technique for maximization of the payoff functions is that the price function in the market may not be known, and any approximation of it may lead to the solution of a task different from the one generated by the market. We use empirical data from Bulgaria’s beer market to illustrate the created model. The statistical data gives fair information on how the players react without knowing the price function, their cost function, or their aims towards a specific market. We present two models based on the real data and their approximations, respectively. The two models, although different, show similar behavior in terms of time and the stability of the market equilibrium. Thus, the notion of response functions and tripled fixed points seems to present a justified way of modeling market processes in oligopoly markets when searching whether the market has reached equilibrium and if this equilibrium is unique and stable in time
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来源期刊
Econometrics
Econometrics Economics, Econometrics and Finance-Economics and Econometrics
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
20.00%
发文量
30
审稿时长
11 weeks
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