数据传输基础设施与 ML-Profile漏洞的博弈策略

Nageswara S. V. Rao;Chris Y. T. Ma;Fei He
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引用次数: 0

摘要

由数据传输节点(DTN)组成的数据传输基础设施对于满足云、数据存储库以及超级计算机和仪器群的分布式计算和存储需求至关重要。使用机器学习(ML)方法估算的基础设施吞吐量曲线是连接往返时间的函数,是其运行状态的指标,已被用于监控、诊断和优化目的。我们的研究表明,可以利用 ML 方法估算的吞吐量曲线的固有统计变化和精度,在未经授权的情况下使用 DTN 的计算和网络容量。我们提出了一个博弈论公式,它捕捉到了试图隐藏在吞吐量曲线统计变化下的攻击者与试图平衡破坏检测与吞吐量测量成本的提供者之间的成本效益权衡。通过利用 ML-estimate 的广义方程,适应该博弈的纳什均衡条件为攻击者和提供者的成功概率提供了定性的见解和界限。我们展示的实验结果说明了这种博弈,在这种博弈中,利用 ML 估计特性的攻击者可以在不被检测到的情况下破坏大部分 DTN 计算能力。
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Game Strategies for Data Transfer Infrastructures Against ML-Profile Exploits
Data transfer infrastructures composed of Data Transfer Nodes (DTN) are critical to meeting distributed computing and storage demands of clouds, data repositories, and complexes of supercomputers and instruments. The infrastructure’s throughput profile, estimated as a function of the connection round trip time using Machine Learning (ML) methods, is an indicator of its operational state, and has been utilized for monitoring, diagnosis and optimization purposes. We show that the inherent statistical variations and precision of throughput profiles estimated by ML methods can be exploited for unauthorized use of DTNs’ computing and network capacity. We present a game theoretic formulation that captures the cost-benefit trade-offs between an attacker that attempts to hide under the profile’s statistical variations and a provider that attempts to balance compromise detection with the cost of throughput measurements. The Nash equilibrium conditions adapted to this game provide qualitative insights and bounds for the success probabilities of the attacker and provider, by utilizing the generalization equation of ML-estimate. We present experimental results that illustrate this game wherein a significant portion of DTN computing capacity is compromised without being detected by an attacker that exploits the ML estimate properties.
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