Abe de Jong, Pouyan Ghazizadeh, Frederik P. Schlingemann, Farhan Shazia
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Why do managers announce the intention to sell large assets?
Nearly one‐third of asset sale announcements are preceded by a public statement of the intent to sell. These voluntary disclosures generate significant average returns of 1.1%. Pre‐announcements bias returns around the actual asset sales toward zero. Due to opportunistic managerial behavior, pre‐announcements occur after poor stock performance and CEO turnover. Managers also opportunistically exercise options around the pre‐announcements and receive potential benefits from the uptick in stock prices. Although we find no effect of pre‐announcements on long‐term operational performance, we do observe a negative effect on stock returns using three and four‐factor models.
期刊介绍:
The International Review of Finance (IRF) publishes high-quality research on all aspects of financial economics, including traditional areas such as asset pricing, corporate finance, market microstructure, financial intermediation and regulation, financial econometrics, financial engineering and risk management, as well as new areas such as markets and institutions of emerging market economies, especially those in the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, the Letters Section in IRF is a premium outlet of letter-length research in all fields of finance. The length of the articles in the Letters Section is limited to a maximum of eight journal pages.