拍卖理论和人口学

O. A. Malafeyev, I. E. Khomenko
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在经济学中,有许多方法可以描述 "卖方 "和 "买方 "之间的互动。最常见的是固定价格销售,我们几乎每天都在与它打交道。当我们有许多卖家和许多买家,产品的价格根据供求关系的条件而变化时,这种方式非常适合销售大量产品。然而,一对一交易是一种更不稳定的选择,这也是它更难建模的原因,因为它与其说是由算法决定的,不如说是由心理和双方讨价还价能力的差异决定的。更接近拍卖的一个例子是价格歧视,即买方的价格不仅由供求关系决定,还由买方所属的群体决定。但在这种情况下,产品并不是唯一的,最终的卖家也是唯一的。因此,我们确定了 "博弈 "的主要拍卖标准及其特征。
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Auction theory and demography
In economics, there are many ways to describe the interaction between a "seller" and a "buyer". The most common one, with which we interact almost every day, is selling for a fixed price. This option is perfect for selling a mass product, when we have a number of sellers and many buyers, and the price for the product varies depending on the conditions of the relationship between supply and demand. Another situation meets us already in markets, where a product can be either mass-produced or more unique, so this option is already closer to the object of our discussion.However, a one-on-one transaction is a much more unstable option, which is why it is also more difficult to model, since it is determined not so much by algorithms as by psychology and the difference in the bargaining ability of the two parties. An even closer example of an auction is price discrimination, when the price for the buyer is determined not only by supply and demand, but also by which group the buyer belongs to. But in this case, the product is not unique, and the final seller is the only one. Thus, we have identified the main auction criteria and their features of the "game".
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