联邦储备事实上独立的神话

IF 1.5 4区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Economics & Politics Pub Date : 2024-07-10 DOI:10.1111/ecpo.12304
Giovanni B. Pittaluga, Elena Seghezza, Pierluigi Morelli
{"title":"联邦储备事实上独立的神话","authors":"Giovanni B. Pittaluga, Elena Seghezza, Pierluigi Morelli","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12304","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In the literature on central banks independence these institutions are considered as being apolitical. In reality, central banks are political actors and their de facto independence changes over time even if their de jure independence remains unvaried. An example of this is the Federal Reserve Bank (Fed), whose de facto independence in the past decades has fluctuated significantly because of the pressures of Congress and the President. To counter these pressures, the Fed seeks support from certain interest groups. The success of this behavior is more likely when the President and Congress represent different political parties.","PeriodicalId":47220,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The myth of federal reserve de facto independence\",\"authors\":\"Giovanni B. Pittaluga, Elena Seghezza, Pierluigi Morelli\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/ecpo.12304\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In the literature on central banks independence these institutions are considered as being apolitical. In reality, central banks are political actors and their de facto independence changes over time even if their de jure independence remains unvaried. An example of this is the Federal Reserve Bank (Fed), whose de facto independence in the past decades has fluctuated significantly because of the pressures of Congress and the President. To counter these pressures, the Fed seeks support from certain interest groups. The success of this behavior is more likely when the President and Congress represent different political parties.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47220,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Economics & Politics\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Economics & Politics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12304\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economics & Politics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12304","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

在有关中央银行独立性的文献中,这些机构被认为是非政治性的。实际上,中央银行是政治行为体,即使其法律上的独立性保持不变,其事实上的独立性也会随着时间的推移而变化。联邦储备银行(美联储)就是一个例子,在过去几十年中,由于国会和总统的压力,美联储事实上的独立性发生了很大波动。为了对抗这些压力,美联储寻求某些利益集团的支持。当总统和国会代表不同的政党时,这种行为更有可能取得成功。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
The myth of federal reserve de facto independence
In the literature on central banks independence these institutions are considered as being apolitical. In reality, central banks are political actors and their de facto independence changes over time even if their de jure independence remains unvaried. An example of this is the Federal Reserve Bank (Fed), whose de facto independence in the past decades has fluctuated significantly because of the pressures of Congress and the President. To counter these pressures, the Fed seeks support from certain interest groups. The success of this behavior is more likely when the President and Congress represent different political parties.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
10.00%
发文量
32
期刊介绍: Economics & Politics focuses on analytical political economy, broadly defined as the study of economic and political phenomena and policy in models that include political processes, institutions and markets. The journal is the source for innovative theoretical and empirical work on the intersection of politics and economics, at both domestic and international levels, and aims to promote new approaches on how these forces interact to affect political outcomes and policy choices, economic performance and societal welfare. Economics & Politics is a vital source of information for economists, academics and students, providing: - Analytical political economics - International scholarship - Accessible & thought-provoking articles - Creative inter-disciplinary analysis
期刊最新文献
What causes polarized stagnation, corporate economy, or welfare state?: Insights from new development economics The effects of non‐trade non‐rent barriers on intra‐Africa trade Patriarchy, pandemics, and the gendered resource curse thesis: Evidence from petroleum geology How does oil policy uncertainty influence resource rents? New empirical evidence from Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Appropriability, institutions, and welfare in a Tullock contest
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1