刻板行为与期望:独裁者游戏中的性别差异

IF 2.5 2区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2024-07-06 DOI:10.1016/j.joep.2024.102742
Christine Austermann, Korbinian von Blanckenburg, Anja Iseke, Eva Tebbe
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引用次数: 0

摘要

一般来说,实验经济学中经常会对性别差异进行研究,但研究结果仍无定论。在本研究中,我们在 Blanckenburg, Tebbe, & Iseke (2023) 的基础上,重点研究了独裁者博弈中预期的性别差异和特定性别的刻板心态。通过区分刻板行为和刻板期望,我们对之前的研究进行了补充。因此,我们通过三个步骤对经典的独裁者游戏进行了扩展,以研究接受者是否会根据独裁者分配给他们的资金数量而对独裁者的性别产生刻板印象。首先,我们要求受试者估计金额。然后,我们揭示了独裁者实际分配给受助者的金额,最后,我们要求受助者评估独裁者的性别。以前的研究结果表明,独裁者分配的金额没有性别差异,与此不同的是,我们根据独裁者分配给收款人的金额,发现了收款人对独裁者有刻板期望的证据。
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Stereotypical behavior vs. expectations: Gender differences in a dictator game

In general gender differences have frequently been studied in experimental economics, but the findings remain inconclusive. In this study, we focus on gender differences in expectations and gender specific stereotypic mindsets in a dictator game, building on Blanckenburg, Tebbe, & Iseke (2023). We add to prior work by differentiating between stereotypical behavior and stereotypical expectations. Accordingly, we extended the classic dictator game by three steps in order to study whether recipients develop stereotypical beliefs regarding the dictator’s gender based on the amount of money the dictator has allocated to them. First, we asked recipients to estimate the amount. We then revealed the amount the dictator actually allocated to the recipient and finally, we asked the recipient to assess the dictator’s gender. In contrast to and building on previous results which show no gender differences regarding the amount the dictators allocate, we find evidence for stereotypical expectations of the recipients based on the amount the dictator allocates to them.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.20
自引率
31.40%
发文量
69
审稿时长
63 days
期刊介绍: The Journal aims to present research that will improve understanding of behavioral, in particular psychological, aspects of economic phenomena and processes. The Journal seeks to be a channel for the increased interest in using behavioral science methods for the study of economic behavior, and so to contribute to better solutions of societal problems, by stimulating new approaches and new theorizing about economic affairs. Economic psychology as a discipline studies the psychological mechanisms that underlie economic behavior. It deals with preferences, judgments, choices, economic interaction, and factors influencing these, as well as the consequences of judgements and decisions for economic processes and phenomena. This includes the impact of economic institutions upon human behavior and well-being. Studies in economic psychology may relate to different levels of aggregation, from the household and the individual consumer to the macro level of whole nations. Economic behavior in connection with inflation, unemployment, taxation, economic development, as well as consumer information and economic behavior in the market place are thus among the fields of interest. The journal also encourages submissions dealing with social interaction in economic contexts, like bargaining, negotiation, or group decision-making. The Journal of Economic Psychology contains: (a) novel reports of empirical (including: experimental) research on economic behavior; (b) replications studies; (c) assessments of the state of the art in economic psychology; (d) articles providing a theoretical perspective or a frame of reference for the study of economic behavior; (e) articles explaining the implications of theoretical developments for practical applications; (f) book reviews; (g) announcements of meetings, conferences and seminars.
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