Journal of Economic Psychology最新文献

When choice matters: The asymmetric effects of precommitment implementation on healthy food choice 当选择重要：承诺前执行对健康食品选择的不对称影响

IF 2.3 2区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Psychology

Pub Date : 2026-02-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2026.102889

Marta Favara , Joanna Mihaylova , Alan Sánchez

This paper investigates the role of precommitment in making healthy food choices, using a lab-in-the-field experiment embedded in the Young Lives longitudinal study in Peru. Leveraging the fact that participants were scheduled for a blood test and would therefore require a snack afterwards, we elicited participants’ snack choice from a predefined set. Participants were asked whether they wished to pre-commit to their preferred snack choice (either healthy or unhealthy) to be consumed the following day, following their blood test, or to choose the snack on the spot. A randomised subsample was informed about the rationale for precommitment (information treatment) prior to their decision. After deciding whether they would like to pre-commit their snack choice or not, participants were again randomised into two groups: the first group had their preferred choice (either pre-commit or choose on the spot) implemented; in contrast, the second group’s choice was overridden (‘choice override’ treatment). Our findings suggest that: first, there is a high demand for precommitment, with 68.5% of participants wanting to pre-commit their preferred snack choice. Second, the information treatment had no significant effect on participants’ willingness to pre-commit. Third, overriding participants’ precommitment decision leads to asymmetric effects on desired behaviour: for those who had pre-committed to a healthy snack, being forced to choose on the spot decreases healthy food choice; conversely, those who pre-committed to an unhealthy snack were more likely to choose a healthy one. These findings highlight the need to carefully target commitment devices, given their potential asymmetric effects on desired behaviours.

本文调查了预先承诺在健康食品选择中的作用，使用了秘鲁年轻生活纵向研究中嵌入的现场实验室实验。考虑到参与者被安排进行血液测试，因此之后需要零食，我们从预定义的集合中引出参与者的零食选择。参与者被问及他们是希望在血液测试后提前决定第二天食用的零食（健康或不健康），还是当场选择零食。在他们做出决定之前，一个随机的子样本被告知承诺前（信息处理）的基本原理。在决定他们是否愿意提前选择零食后，参与者再次被随机分为两组：第一组执行他们的首选（要么提前选择，要么当场选择）；相比之下，第二组的选择被推翻（“选择推翻”治疗）。我们的研究结果表明：首先，有很高的预先承诺需求，68.5%的参与者想要预先承诺他们喜欢的零食选择。第二，信息处理对被试的预承诺意愿没有显著影响。第三，压倒参与者的事前决定导致对期望行为的不对称影响：对于那些预先承诺健康零食的人来说，被迫当场选择健康食品减少了他们的选择；相反，那些事先承诺吃不健康零食的人更有可能选择健康零食。这些发现强调，鉴于承诺手段对期望行为的潜在不对称影响，有必要谨慎地瞄准承诺手段。

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引用次数: 0

Aging and financial risk-taking: A meta-analysis 老龄化与金融风险：一项荟萃分析

IF 2.3 2区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Psychology

Pub Date : 2026-01-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2026.102888

Erica Ordali, Chiara Rapallini

This paper examines the association between aging and financial risk attitudes by conducting a meta-analytical review of empirical evidence from the economic and psychological literature. We find that differences in effects are largely driven by the methods used to measure risk preferences. In particular, the positive association between risk aversion and age is confirmed in studies using survey data and lotteries, whereas psychological tasks highlight the role of the learning process and suggest that cognitive abilities and health status may influence preferences. The meta-regression on effect sizes from survey-based studies reveals not only the importance of using longitudinal data but also that cognitive abilities and health status account for a significant portion of the heterogeneity in this sample.

本文通过对经济和心理学文献的实证证据进行荟萃分析，研究了老龄化与金融风险态度之间的关系。我们发现，影响的差异很大程度上是由用于衡量风险偏好的方法驱动的。特别是，风险厌恶与年龄之间的正相关在使用调查数据和彩票的研究中得到证实，而心理任务强调学习过程的作用，并表明认知能力和健康状况可能影响偏好。对基于调查的研究的效应大小进行meta回归，不仅揭示了使用纵向数据的重要性，而且表明认知能力和健康状况在该样本的异质性中占很大一部分。

引用次数: 0

Measuring employers’ demand for personality traits in job ads 衡量雇主在招聘广告中对个性特征的需求

IF 2.3 2区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Psychology

Pub Date : 2026-01-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2026.102887

Vera Brenčič , Andrew McGee

We propose measures of employers’ demands for personality traits from job ads based on employers’ use of trait-descriptive terms from the psychology literature on personality. Identifying personality demands in job ads requires addressing challenges such as the prevalence of false positives. We demonstrate that as many as half of all instances of trait descriptive terms in job ads are false positives in the sense that they do not refer to workers’ personalities. The presence of false negatives is less problematic. After eliminating false positives, we validate that our measures capture employers’ demand for personality traits by showing that, at the occupation level, our measures are correlated with the traits of individuals in those occupations for all traits except emotional stability. In our sample of job ads, personality trait demands are as prevalent as requirements for educational attainment and work experience. Consistent with evidence on the importance of social skills in the labor market, extroversion is the trait most sought by employers, but a substantial fraction of ads also indicate demand for conscientiousness, openness, and agreeableness.

基于用人单位对人格心理学文献中特质描述术语的使用，我们提出了用人单位对招聘广告中人格特质要求的测量方法。识别招聘广告中的个性需求需要解决一些挑战，比如普遍存在的误报。我们证明，在招聘广告中，多达一半的特质描述词都是假阳性的，因为它们并没有指的是员工的个性。假阴性的存在是不太成问题的。在排除误报之后，我们验证了我们的测量方法捕捉到了雇主对人格特质的需求，通过显示，在职业层面上，我们的测量方法与这些职业中除情绪稳定性外的所有特征都相关。在我们的招聘广告样本中，人格特质的要求与教育程度和工作经验的要求一样普遍。与社会技能在劳动力市场上的重要性的证据一致，外向是雇主最追求的特质，但相当一部分广告也表明对责任心、开放性和亲和性的需求。

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引用次数: 0

From individual choices to the four-eyes principle: The big robber game revisited among financial professionals and students 从个人选择到四眼原则：金融专业人士和学生重新审视了大盗游戏

IF 2.3 2区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Psychology

Pub Date : 2026-01-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2026.102885

Armando Holzknecht, Sebastian Bachler, Jürgen Huber, Michael Kirchler

While headline news programs frequently report cases of large-scale fraud, corruption, and other immoral behavior, laboratory experiments often show prosocial behaviors in strategic games. To reconcile and explain these seemingly conflicting observations, Alós-Ferrer et al. (2022) introduced the

B i g

R o b b e r

G a m e

(BRG)—an altered dictator game where one robber can take money from multiple

v i c t i m s

. They reported low levels of prosocial behavior among a pool of student subjects, who behaved more prosocially in bilateral games than in the BRG. In our study, we conceptually replicate Alós-Ferrer et al. (2022) and extend the BRG to a 2x2 factorial design with over 870 participants, comparing the behavior of financial professionals and students. Moreover, inspired by the four-eyes principle, a common practice in the finance industry, we investigate decision-making both individually and in pairs. We find overall support for the results of Alós-Ferrer et al. (2022) and add that finance professionals rob less than students. Accounting for multiple hypothesis testing and control variables, we find that treatment differences disappear, indicating similar behavior across individuals, pairs, finance professionals, and students. Finally, in a series of exploratory analyses, we show that

v i c t i m s

expect finance professionals to rob significantly more than students, implying that finance professionals are considered to be less prosocial than students’ peers.

虽然头条新闻节目经常报道大规模欺诈、腐败和其他不道德行为，但实验室实验经常显示战略游戏中的亲社会行为。为了调和和解释这些看似矛盾的观察结果，Alós-Ferrer等人（2022）引入了大强盗游戏（BRG）——一个改变的独裁者游戏，一个强盗可以从多个受害者那里拿走钱。他们报告说，在一群学生受试者中，亲社会行为水平较低，他们在双边游戏中比在BRG中表现得更亲社会。在我们的研究中，我们从概念上复制Alós-Ferrer等人（2022），并将BRG扩展为2x2因子设计，有超过870名参与者，比较金融专业人士和学生的行为。此外，受四眼原则（金融行业的一种常见做法）的启发，我们研究了单独和成对的决策。我们发现Alós-Ferrer等人（2022）的结果总体上得到了支持，并补充说，金融专业人士的抢劫比学生少。考虑到多个假设检验和控制变量，我们发现待遇差异消失了，表明个人、配对、金融专业人士和学生之间的行为相似。最后，在一系列探索性分析中，我们发现受害者对金融专业人员的抢劫期望明显高于学生，这意味着金融专业人员被认为比学生同龄人更不亲社会。

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引用次数: 0

Replication: No action ‘Bias’ among elite soccer goalkeepers during penalty kicks 复制：精英足球守门员在罚点球时没有“偏见”

IF 2.3 2区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Psychology

Pub Date : 2026-01-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2026.102886

Rishav Singh, Sumitava Mukherjee

One of the core questions in economic psychology has been whether decision making is optimal. It is especially important to study this question in naturalistic environments, with significant real-world consequences. One such example is on-field decisions during penalty kicks in soccer. Bar-Eli and colleagues (Bar-Eli, M., Azar, O. H., Ritov, I., Keidar-Levin, Y., & Schein, G. (2007). Action bias among elite soccer goalkeepers: The case of penalty kicks. Journal of Economic Psychology, 28(5), 606–621.) claimed that elite soccer goalkeepers during penalty kicks have an action bias: they jump to the left or right much more often, even though the optimal action would be to stay in the center. They further comment that biased decision making among such professionals is quite unexpected, given the huge incentives they have for making optimal decisions. Given the large implications of such a possibility, we re-looked at this claim by examining the distribution of 292 on-target penalty kicks from a different dataset: Men’s World Cup matches (1982–2022), which is one of the high-stake elite soccer tournaments in the world. Although goalkeepers were jumping more often towards the left or right and staying less often in the center, they had statistically similar chances of stopping the goal for both decisions. Additionally, there were more kicks to the left and right compared to the center. Thus, we conclude that jumping is not a sub-optimal action for goalkeepers and high frequency of jumping is not indicative of action ‘bias’, which suggests competent decisions by these professional goalkeepers during penalty kicks.

经济心理学的核心问题之一是决策是否最优。在自然环境中研究这个问题尤其重要，因为它会对现实世界产生重大影响。其中一个例子就是足球比赛中的点球判罚。Bar-Eli和同事(Bar-Eli， M., Azar， O. H., Ritov， I., Keidar-Levin， Y., & Schein， G.（2007）。精英足球守门员的行动偏见：点球案例。《经济心理学杂志》（Journal of Economic Psychology）， 28(5), 606-621 .)声称，在罚点球时，优秀的足球守门员有一种动作偏差：他们更频繁地向左或向右跳，尽管最佳的动作是呆在中间。他们进一步评论说，考虑到这些专业人士做出最佳决策的巨大动机，他们做出有偏见的决策是相当出乎意料的。考虑到这种可能性的巨大影响，我们通过检查来自不同数据集的292次射正点球的分布来重新审视这一说法：男足世界杯比赛（1982-2022），这是世界上高风险的精英足球锦标赛之一。尽管守门员更频繁地向左路或右路扑去，而在中路停留的次数更少，但从统计数据来看，他们在这两种情况下阻止进球的机会是相似的。此外，与中路相比，左路和右路的踢球次数更多。因此，我们得出结论，对于守门员来说，跳跃并不是次优动作，高频率的跳跃并不表明动作“偏向”，这表明这些职业守门员在罚点球时做出了合格的决定。

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引用次数: 0

Out of sight is out of mind? Experimentally testing a gradually materializing public bad 眼不见心不烦？实验性地测试逐渐具体化的公共不良

IF 2.3 2区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Psychology

Pub Date : 2026-01-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2026.102877

Alexander Egberts , Christoph Engel , Joshua Fairfield

Many social ills can be modeled as a public bad. In such scenarios, private benefit is often immediate, while the public damage takes some time to materialize. In this experiment, we investigate the behavioral effects caused by such delays in the realization of collective harm. By manipulating the weight with which the damages caused by group contributions are carried over to the next round, we alter the number of periods required for the social damage to unfold fully. We keep constant the economic consequences of contributions between treatments (by introducing a multiplier for the damage) and between periods (by deducting all unrealized harm at the end of the game) to avoid multiple equilibria. In a second treatment dimension, we isolate the cognitive challenges of this experiment by replacing human group members with “computerized players” that perfectly copy each subject’s previous behavior. We find that participants’ behavior is less cooperative over time when harm is deferred into the future. Our results also suggest that the driving mechanism behind this effect is not insufficient anticipation, but the lack of having experienced the negative consequences of the public damage.

许多社会弊病都可以作为公共弊病的模型。在这种情况下，私人利益往往是立竿见影的，而公共损害需要一段时间才能实现。在本实验中，我们研究了这种延迟在集体伤害实现过程中所造成的行为效应。通过操纵由群体贡献造成的损害被转移到下一轮的权重，我们改变了社会损害充分展开所需的时期数量。为了避免多重平衡，我们在不同治疗（通过引入伤害乘数）和不同时期（通过在游戏结束时扣除所有未实现的伤害）之间保持贡献的经济后果不变。在第二个治疗维度，我们通过用“计算机化的玩家”取代人类小组成员来隔离这个实验的认知挑战，这些玩家完美地复制了每个受试者之前的行为。我们发现，随着时间的推移，当伤害被推迟到未来时，参与者的行为会变得不那么合作。我们的研究结果还表明，这种效应背后的驱动机制不是预期不足，而是缺乏对公共损害的负面后果的体验。

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引用次数: 0

The sober outlook of proficient investors –Characterizing competence through canonical correlation analysis 熟练投资者的冷静观——用典型相关分析表征能力

IF 2.3 2区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Psychology

Pub Date : 2025-12-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2025.102876

Doron Sonsino , Patrik Michaelsen , Tommy Gärling , Magnus Jansson

The identification of competence in financial decision is complicated by endogeneity concerns, and the problem aggravates in experimental studies controlling for expectations and confidence. This paper promotes the use of Canonical Correlation Analysis to characterize competence, circumventing all endogeneity obstacles. CCA is applied to extract the competence index (CMPT) that exhibits the strongest predictive power for the performance of 141 Swedish investors in framed-field prediction/trading tasks. The winning CMPT integrates four dissimilar variables that have been separately linked with proficient decision in preceding research, including self-assessed market familiarity and confidence in the accuracy of predictions. Portfolios that copy/reverse the trades of the highest/lowest CMPT deciles earn more than 10% annualized return, net of borrowing costs. Competence currently links with pessimistic predictions, selling stocks even when predictions are positive, and sceptical view of professional analysis.

财务决策能力的识别因内生性问题而变得复杂，并且在控制预期和信心的实验研究中问题加剧。本文提倡使用典型相关分析来表征能力，规避了所有内生性障碍。CCA应用于提取能力指数（CMPT），该指数对141名瑞典投资者在框架场预测/交易任务中的表现表现出最强的预测能力。获胜的CMPT整合了四个不同的变量，这些变量在之前的研究中分别与熟练决策相关，包括自我评估的市场熟悉度和对预测准确性的信心。复制/逆转CMPT最高/最低十分位数交易的投资组合，扣除借款成本后的年化回报率超过10%。目前，能力与悲观预测、即使预测是积极的也要卖出股票以及对专业分析持怀疑态度联系在一起。

引用次数: 0

Information combination and preference reversals: Eye-tracking data 信息组合与偏好逆转：眼动追踪数据

IF 2.3 2区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Psychology

Pub Date : 2025-12-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2025.102875

Raúl López-Pérez , Eli Spiegelman

In the classic preference reversal (PR) phenomenon, individuals often choose the safer of two gambles but assign a higher monetary evaluation to the riskier one. A key distinction between choice and evaluation tasks is that the former typically require comparative processing of the two bets, while the latter can be conducted in isolation for each bet. If this task-mode difference plays a causal role in generating PRs, then the frequency of PRs across individuals should correlate with differences in comparative cognitive processes across tasks. Assuming that sequences of visual fixations reflect cognitive comparisons, we test this hypothesis using eye-tracking during a classic PR experiment. Specifically, we compare the prevalence of across-bet transitions, eye movements between the probabilities or prizes of different bets, with within-bet transitions, movements between attributes of the same bet. As expected, participants exhibit more across-bet transitions in Choice than in Evaluation. However, variation in transition patterns does not predict behavior or PR incidence, challenging context-dependent explanations of classical PRs.

在经典的偏好反转（PR）现象中，个人通常会在两个赌博中选择更安全的那个，而对风险更高的那个给予更高的货币评价。选择任务和评估任务之间的一个关键区别是，前者通常需要对两个投注进行比较处理，而后者可以单独对每个投注进行处理。如果这种任务模式的差异在pr的产生中起着因果作用，那么个体之间pr的频率应该与不同任务之间比较认知过程的差异相关。假设视觉注视序列反映了认知比较，我们在一个经典的公关实验中使用眼球追踪来验证这一假设。具体来说，我们比较了跨赌注转换的流行程度，不同赌注的概率或奖品之间的眼球运动，以及赌注内转换，同一赌注的属性之间的运动。正如预期的那样，参与者在选择中比在评估中表现出更多的跨赌注转换。然而，转变模式的变化并不能预测行为或PR发生率，这对经典PR的上下文依赖解释提出了挑战。

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引用次数: 0

Intuitive prosociality: heterogeneous treatment effects or false positive? 直觉亲社会性：异质性治疗效果还是假阳性？

IF 2.3 2区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Psychology

Pub Date : 2025-12-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2025.102873

Amanda Kvarven , Eirik Strømland , Gaute Torsvik

This paper uses a randomized experiment on a representative sample from the Norwegian population (N = 1368) to test whether prosocial behavior is intuitive. We use time pressure to capture intuitive decision making and a dictator game to measure prosocial behavior. We also estimate and test for “population heterogeneity” in the effect size. First, we exogenously vary subject experience with economic games to test whether experience influences the treatment effect. Second, we leverage our data structure to conduct a “pseudo meta-analysis,” assessing effect size heterogeneity across several potential sources of heterogeneity. This helps us assess whether prior findings in the literature stem from false positives or genuine heterogeneity in effect sizes. Our results show no evidence that experience with economic experiments moderates the time pressure effect. The estimated heterogeneity in effect sizes in the pseudo meta-analysis is negligible. Further, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a uniform p-value distribution, and our rejection rate aligns with the expected 5 % from chance alone. These findings support the view that the apparent link between prosocial behavior and intuitive processing is likely due to false positives rather than heterogeneous treatment effects.

本文采用挪威人口代表性样本（N = 1368）的随机实验来检验亲社会行为是否具有直觉性。我们用时间压力来捕捉直觉决策，用独裁者游戏来衡量亲社会行为。我们还估计和检验了效应大小中的“群体异质性”。首先，我们通过经济博弈外生性地改变受试者的经验，以检验经验是否会影响治疗效果。其次，我们利用我们的数据结构进行“伪元分析”，评估几个潜在异质性来源的效应大小异质性。这有助于我们评估文献中的先前发现是源于假阳性还是效应大小的真正异质性。我们的研究结果表明，没有证据表明经济实验的经验会调节时间压力效应。伪荟萃分析中效应大小的估计异质性可以忽略不计。此外，我们不能拒绝统一p值分布的零假设，我们的拒绝率与预期的5%保持一致。这些发现支持了亲社会行为和直觉处理之间的明显联系可能是由于假阳性而不是异质性治疗效果。

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引用次数: 0

Outcome bias in managerial decisions 管理决策的结果偏差

IF 2.3 2区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Psychology

Pub Date : 2025-12-06 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2025.102872

Jan C. van Ours

Decisions informed by past events can be distorted when outcomes partially determined by chance are misinterpreted as being purely skill-based. This can lead to outcome bias, where decisions are evaluated based on results rather than on the quality of the performance that produced them. Outcome bias is prevalent across various domains, including managerial decision-making. This paper investigates outcome bias in professional football, a highly competitive industry. The analysis focuses on managers who were replaced mid-season between 2017/18 and 2024/25 in the top divisions of the five major European football leagues. The main finding is that clubs tend to change managers in response to recent match results rather than to underlying performance indicators. This behavior reflects an economically inefficient decision-making process driven by outcome bias.

当部分由偶然决定的结果被误解为纯粹基于技能时，根据过去事件做出的决定可能会被扭曲。这可能导致结果偏差，即决策是根据结果而不是根据产生这些结果的绩效质量来评估的。结果偏差在各个领域都很普遍，包括管理决策。本文研究了职业足球这个竞争激烈的行业的结果偏差。该分析的重点是在2017/18赛季至2024/25赛季期间，在欧洲五大足球联赛的顶级联赛中被替换的主教练。主要的发现是，俱乐部倾向于根据最近的比赛结果而不是基本的表现指标来更换主教练。这种行为反映了由结果偏差驱动的经济上低效的决策过程。

引用次数: 0