不同合作竞争模式下第三方再制造商的融资决策：采用区块链的影响

IF 2.5 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-10 DOI:10.1002/mde.4311

Peng Ma, Junmei Li, Henry Xu, Mingjun Chen

{"title":"不同合作竞争模式下第三方再制造商的融资决策：采用区块链的影响","authors":"Peng Ma, Junmei Li, Henry Xu, Mingjun Chen","doi":"10.1002/mde.4311","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>The third-party remanufacturer (TPR) can cooperate with the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and remanufactured products are sold by the OEM (i.e., the cooperation mode). The TPR can also sell remanufactured products individually to compete with the OEM's new products (i.e., the competition mode). Considering the issue of false information in remanufacturing supply chains and the TPR's limited capital, we build game models with blockchain to explore the TPR's optimal financing strategies under different co-opetition mode selections. We find that a high blockchain usage prompts the TPR to finance from the OEM in the competition mode, while a low blockchain usage motivates the TPR to choose the cooperation mode and opt for a bank credit. Besides, we also find that the difference between the TPR's optimal profits of cooperation and competition modes increases with the interest rate.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Financing decisions of third-party remanufacturers with different co-opetition modes: The impact of blockchain adoption\",\"authors\":\"Peng Ma, Junmei Li, Henry Xu, Mingjun Chen\",\"doi\":\"10.1002/mde.4311\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>The third-party remanufacturer (TPR) can cooperate with the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and remanufactured products are sold by the OEM (i.e., the cooperation mode). The TPR can also sell remanufactured products individually to compete with the OEM's new products (i.e., the competition mode). Considering the issue of false information in remanufacturing supply chains and the TPR's limited capital, we build game models with blockchain to explore the TPR's optimal financing strategies under different co-opetition mode selections. We find that a high blockchain usage prompts the TPR to finance from the OEM in the competition mode, while a low blockchain usage motivates the TPR to choose the cooperation mode and opt for a bank credit. Besides, we also find that the difference between the TPR's optimal profits of cooperation and competition modes increases with the interest rate.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":18186,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Managerial and Decision Economics\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Managerial and Decision Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/mde.4311\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Managerial and Decision Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/mde.4311","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

第三方再制造商（TPR）可以与原始设备制造商（OEM）合作，由原始设备制造商销售再制造产品（即合作模式）。第三方再制造企业也可以单独销售再制造产品，与原始设备制造商的新产品竞争（即竞争模式）。考虑到再制造供应链中的虚假信息问题和 TPR 的有限资金，我们利用区块链建立了博弈模型，以探索 TPR 在不同合作竞争模式选择下的最优融资策略。我们发现，在竞争模式下，区块链的高使用率会促使TPR向原始设备制造商融资，而区块链的低使用率则会促使TPR选择合作模式，并选择银行信贷。此外，我们还发现，TPR 在合作模式和竞争模式下的最优利润之间的差异随利率的提高而增大。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文

微信好友朋友圈 QQ好友复制链接

本刊更多论文

Financing decisions of third-party remanufacturers with different co-opetition modes: The impact of blockchain adoption

The third-party remanufacturer (TPR) can cooperate with the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and remanufactured products are sold by the OEM (i.e., the cooperation mode). The TPR can also sell remanufactured products individually to compete with the OEM's new products (i.e., the competition mode). Considering the issue of false information in remanufacturing supply chains and the TPR's limited capital, we build game models with blockchain to explore the TPR's optimal financing strategies under different co-opetition mode selections. We find that a high blockchain usage prompts the TPR to finance from the OEM in the competition mode, while a low blockchain usage motivates the TPR to choose the cooperation mode and opt for a bank credit. Besides, we also find that the difference between the TPR's optimal profits of cooperation and competition modes increases with the interest rate.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Managerial and Decision Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

1.40

自引率

18.20%

发文量

242

期刊介绍： Managerial and Decision Economics will publish articles applying economic reasoning to managerial decision-making and management strategy.Management strategy concerns practical decisions that managers face about how to compete, how to succeed, and how to organize to achieve their goals. Economic thinking and analysis provides a critical foundation for strategic decision-making across a variety of dimensions. For example, economic insights may help in determining which activities to outsource and which to perfom internally. They can help unravel questions regarding what drives performance differences among firms and what allows these differences to persist. They can contribute to an appreciation of how industries, organizations, and capabilities evolve.