合同执行效率与企业纵向专业化:来自中国 "不诚实者公告 "准自然实验的证据

IF 5.2 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS 中国经济评论 Pub Date : 2024-07-14 DOI:10.1016/j.chieco.2024.102241
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引用次数: 0

摘要

契约制度,尤其是契约执行效率在企业纵向边界形成中的作用,在很大程度上被忽视了。通过对中国 "失信被执行人公示 "政策的准自然实验,我们发现,合同执行效率的提高显著促进了企业纵向专业化,这反映在政策实施后企业纵向专业化程度的提高上。交易成本的降低是其合理机制。此外,当企业与老赖伙伴(即政策目标)的接触程度越高时,上述影响就越明显。最后,我们发现,高效的合同执行会促进纵向专业化,从而提高全要素生产率。本研究确定了合同制度与企业纵向专业化之间的因果关系,并扩展了关于 "公布不诚实者 "政策后果的研究。
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Contract enforcement efficiency and corporate vertical specialization: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment of “announcement of dishonest persons” in China

The role of contracting institutions, particularly the contract enforcement efficiency in shaping corporate vertical boundaries, has been largely overlooked. Using a quasi-natural experiment of the policy of “Announcement of Dishonest Persons” in China, we find that improved contract enforcement efficiency significantly promotes corporate vertical specialization, reflected in the improvement of corporate vertical specialization after the policy implementation. Reduction of transaction costs is the plausible mechanism. Moreover, the above impact is more pronounced when the exposure of firms to Laolai partners (i.e., the policy target), is higher. Finally, we find that efficient contract enforcement promotes total factor productivity through facilitating vertical specialization. This study identifies the causality between contracting institutions and corporate vertical specialization and extends research on consequences of the policy of “Announcement of Dishonest Persons”.

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来源期刊
中国经济评论
中国经济评论 ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
10.60
自引率
4.40%
发文量
380
期刊介绍: The China Economic Review publishes original works of scholarship which add to the knowledge of the economy of China and to economies as a discipline. We seek, in particular, papers dealing with policy, performance and institutional change. Empirical papers normally use a formal model, a data set, and standard statistical techniques. Submissions are subjected to double-blind peer review.
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