巴基斯坦家族企业集团的收益管理:公司治理的作用

Sattar Khan, Naimat Ullah Khan, Y. Kamal
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引用次数: 1

摘要

本文旨在利用委托代理理论,研究公司治理(CG)在巴基斯坦证券交易所(PSX)上市的家族企业集团(FBGs)关联公司收益管理(EM)中的作用。设计/方法/方法本研究使用了巴基斯坦证券交易所 2010 年至 2019 年期间的 327 家非金融公司样本,其中包括 187 家集团关联公司和 140 家非关联公司。本研究采用不同的回归模型进行分析,并对新兴市场和金融集团关联的各种替代指标进行了稳健性检验。研究结果表明,与非隶属公司相比,隶属公司中的新兴市场较少。结果显示,FBGs 附属公司与新兴市场之间存在显著的负相关关系。此外,结果还显示,EM 与 CG 指数和集团隶属关系的交互项之间存在正相关关系。这说明有效的治理并不能降低 FBGs 关联公司以及 PSX 非金融公司的新兴市场。此外,与非隶属公司相比,隶属公司的企业管治质量更高。研究结果支持委托代理理论,即在新兴市场中,由于所有权集中现象,企业管治无法通过减少新兴市场来缓解控股股东对小股东的征用行为。研究结果表明,企业管治准则应强制要求公司披露其复杂的所有权结构信息以及关联公司和董事的所有权信息。此外,还建议在巴基斯坦的委托人-委托人冲突背景下重新审视企业管治准则,而不是基于盎格鲁-撒克逊国家的代理理论的代理人-委托人解释。本文的主要贡献之一是制定了全面的 CG 指数。本研究使用了人工收集的有关巴基斯坦 FBG 附属公司的详细新数据。
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Earnings management in the family business groups of Pakistan: the role of corporate governance
Purpose This paper aims to examine the role of corporate governance (CG) in the earnings management (EM) of affiliated companies in family business groups (FBGs) listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX), using principal–principal agency theory. Design/methodology/approach The sample of 327 nonfinancial firms of the PSX, consisting of 187 group-affiliated firms and 140 nonaffiliated firms has been used in this study for the period of 2010 to 2019. The study uses different regression models for analysis, with robustness tests of various alternative measures of EM and FBG affiliation. In addition, endogeneity is controlled with the propensity score matching method. Findings The findings show that EM is less prevalent in affiliated firms compared to nonaffiliated companies. The results show a negative and significant relationship between FBGs affiliated firms and EM. Moreover, the results also show a positive relationship between EM and the interaction term of the CG index and group affiliation. It refers to the fact that effective governance cannot reduce EM in affiliated companies of FBGs as well as in the nonfinancial companies of the PSX. In addition, the quality of CG is higher in affiliated companies compared to its counterpart in nonaffiliated firms. The findings support the principal–principal agency theory that CG cannot mitigate the expropriating behavior of controlling shareholders against minority shareholders by reducing EM in emerging markets due to the ownership concentration phenomenon. Research limitations/implications This research study has implications for small investors, government agencies and regulators. The findings of the study show that CG code should make it mandatory for companies to reveal information about their complex ownership structure and ownership information about affiliated companies and directors. Furthermore, it is suggested to revisit the code of CG in the Pakistani context of principal–principal conflict instead of the agent–principal explanation of agency theory based on Anglo–Saxon countries. Originality/value This research study has contributed to the CG and FBG literature in relation to EM in idiosyncratic settings of Pakistan. One of the prime contributions of the paper is the development of a comprehensive CG index. This research study used detailed, manually collected novel data on affiliated firms of FBGs in Pakistan.
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