首次代币发行中的代币管理:代币保留和转售限制对 ICO 成功的影响

Johannes Fuchs, Paul P. Momtaz
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摘要

首次代币发行(ICO)中信息的高度不对称增加了道德风险、逆向选择和直接欺诈的可能性。代币治理机制可能有助于降低此类投资风险。利用一级市场代币保留和二级市场转售限制的新数据,我们估算了这些治理机制对 ICO 筹资成功和筹资后表现的影响。首先,我们估算了代币保留的估值弹性,结果表明,代币售出量减少 10%,ICO 筹资额就会增加 3.2%。其次,限制 ICO 投资者在二级市场转售代币的能力会对 12 个月的买入并持有异常回报率产生不利影响。我们还讨论了这些治理信号的具体实施的偶然效应,并表明这些效应会受到风险企业人力资本质量的影响。
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Token Governance in Initial Coin Offerings: Implications of Token Retention and Resale Restrictions for ICO Success
The high degree of asymmetric information in initial coin offerings (ICOs) increases the probability of moral hazard, adverse selection, and outright fraud. Token governance mechanisms may help mitigate such investment risks. Using novel data on token retention in the primary market and resale restrictions in the secondary market, we estimate the impact of these governance mechanisms on the fundraising success and post-funding performance of ICOs. First, we estimate the valuation elasticity of token retention, indicating that 10% fewer tokens sold increases the ICO funding amount by 3.2%. Second, restricting ICO investors’ ability to resell tokens in the secondary market has a detrimental impact on the 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal return. We also discuss contingency effects of the specific implementations of these governance signals and show that the effects are moderated by the quality of the venture’s human capital.
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