DeFiRanger:检测 DeFi 价格操纵攻击

IF 7 2区 计算机科学 Q1 COMPUTER SCIENCE, HARDWARE & ARCHITECTURE IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI:10.1109/TDSC.2023.3346888
Siwei Wu, Zhou Yu, Dabao Wang, Yajin Zhou, Lei Wu, Haoyu Wang, Xingliang Yuan
{"title":"DeFiRanger:检测 DeFi 价格操纵攻击","authors":"Siwei Wu, Zhou Yu, Dabao Wang, Yajin Zhou, Lei Wu, Haoyu Wang, Xingliang Yuan","doi":"10.1109/TDSC.2023.3346888","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The rapid growth of Decentralized Finance (DeFi) boosts the blockchain ecosystem. At the same time, attacks on DeFi applications (apps) are increasing. However, to the best of our knowledge, existing smart contract vulnerability detection tools cannot directly detect DeFi attacks. That's because they lack the capability to recover and understand high-level DeFi semantics, e.g., a user trades a token pair X and Y in a Decentralized EXchange (DEX). In this work, we focus on the detection of two new types of price manipulation attacks. To this end, we propose a platform-independent method to identify high-level DeFi semantics. Specifically, we first construct the Cash Flow Tree (CFT) from a raw transaction and then lifting the low-level semantics to high-level ones, including five advanced DeFi actions. Finally, we use patterns expressed with the recovered DeFi semantics to detect price manipulation attacks. We implemented a prototype named DeFiRanger that detected 14 zero-day security incidents. These findings were reported to affected parties or/and the community for the first time. Furthermore, the backtest experiment discovered 15 unknown historical security incidents. We further performed an attack analysis to shed light on the root causes of vulnerabilities incurring price manipulation attacks.","PeriodicalId":13047,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":7.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"DeFiRanger: Detecting DeFi Price Manipulation Attacks\",\"authors\":\"Siwei Wu, Zhou Yu, Dabao Wang, Yajin Zhou, Lei Wu, Haoyu Wang, Xingliang Yuan\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/TDSC.2023.3346888\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The rapid growth of Decentralized Finance (DeFi) boosts the blockchain ecosystem. At the same time, attacks on DeFi applications (apps) are increasing. However, to the best of our knowledge, existing smart contract vulnerability detection tools cannot directly detect DeFi attacks. That's because they lack the capability to recover and understand high-level DeFi semantics, e.g., a user trades a token pair X and Y in a Decentralized EXchange (DEX). In this work, we focus on the detection of two new types of price manipulation attacks. To this end, we propose a platform-independent method to identify high-level DeFi semantics. Specifically, we first construct the Cash Flow Tree (CFT) from a raw transaction and then lifting the low-level semantics to high-level ones, including five advanced DeFi actions. Finally, we use patterns expressed with the recovered DeFi semantics to detect price manipulation attacks. We implemented a prototype named DeFiRanger that detected 14 zero-day security incidents. These findings were reported to affected parties or/and the community for the first time. Furthermore, the backtest experiment discovered 15 unknown historical security incidents. We further performed an attack analysis to shed light on the root causes of vulnerabilities incurring price manipulation attacks.\",\"PeriodicalId\":13047,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":7.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"94\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/TDSC.2023.3346888\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"计算机科学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"COMPUTER SCIENCE, HARDWARE & ARCHITECTURE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/TDSC.2023.3346888","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, HARDWARE & ARCHITECTURE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

摘要

去中心化金融(DeFi)的快速发展推动了区块链生态系统的发展。与此同时,针对 DeFi 应用程序(应用程序)的攻击也在不断增加。然而,据我们所知,现有的智能合约漏洞检测工具无法直接检测到 DeFi 攻击。这是因为它们缺乏恢复和理解高级 DeFi 语义的能力,例如,用户在去中心化交易所(DEX)中交易代币对 X 和 Y。在这项工作中,我们的重点是检测两种新型价格操纵攻击。为此,我们提出了一种独立于平台的方法来识别高级 DeFi 语义。具体来说,我们首先从原始交易构建现金流树(CFT),然后将低级语义提升为高级语义,包括五种高级 DeFi 操作。最后,我们使用恢复后的 DeFi 语义所表达的模式来检测价格操纵攻击。我们实施了一个名为 DeFiRanger 的原型,检测到了 14 起零日安全事件。这些发现首次向受影响方或/和社区进行了报告。此外,回溯测试实验还发现了 15 起未知的历史安全事件。我们进一步进行了攻击分析,以揭示导致价格操纵攻击的漏洞的根本原因。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
DeFiRanger: Detecting DeFi Price Manipulation Attacks
The rapid growth of Decentralized Finance (DeFi) boosts the blockchain ecosystem. At the same time, attacks on DeFi applications (apps) are increasing. However, to the best of our knowledge, existing smart contract vulnerability detection tools cannot directly detect DeFi attacks. That's because they lack the capability to recover and understand high-level DeFi semantics, e.g., a user trades a token pair X and Y in a Decentralized EXchange (DEX). In this work, we focus on the detection of two new types of price manipulation attacks. To this end, we propose a platform-independent method to identify high-level DeFi semantics. Specifically, we first construct the Cash Flow Tree (CFT) from a raw transaction and then lifting the low-level semantics to high-level ones, including five advanced DeFi actions. Finally, we use patterns expressed with the recovered DeFi semantics to detect price manipulation attacks. We implemented a prototype named DeFiRanger that detected 14 zero-day security incidents. These findings were reported to affected parties or/and the community for the first time. Furthermore, the backtest experiment discovered 15 unknown historical security incidents. We further performed an attack analysis to shed light on the root causes of vulnerabilities incurring price manipulation attacks.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing 工程技术-计算机:软件工程
CiteScore
11.20
自引率
5.50%
发文量
354
审稿时长
9 months
期刊介绍: The "IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing (TDSC)" is a prestigious journal that publishes high-quality, peer-reviewed research in the field of computer science, specifically targeting the development of dependable and secure computing systems and networks. This journal is dedicated to exploring the fundamental principles, methodologies, and mechanisms that enable the design, modeling, and evaluation of systems that meet the required levels of reliability, security, and performance. The scope of TDSC includes research on measurement, modeling, and simulation techniques that contribute to the understanding and improvement of system performance under various constraints. It also covers the foundations necessary for the joint evaluation, verification, and design of systems that balance performance, security, and dependability. By publishing archival research results, TDSC aims to provide a valuable resource for researchers, engineers, and practitioners working in the areas of cybersecurity, fault tolerance, and system reliability. The journal's focus on cutting-edge research ensures that it remains at the forefront of advancements in the field, promoting the development of technologies that are critical for the functioning of modern, complex systems.
期刊最新文献
DSChain: A Blockchain System for Complete Lifecycle Security of Data in Internet of Things Privacy-Preserving and Energy-Saving Random Forest-Based Disease Detection Framework for Green Internet of Things in Mobile Healthcare Networks IvyRedaction: Enabling Atomic, Consistent and Accountable Cross-Chain Rewriting Multi-Adjustable Join Schemes With Adaptive Indistinguishably Security User Authentication on Earable Devices via Bone-Conducted Occlusion Sounds
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1