{"title":"康德向持怀疑态度的经验主义者提出的建议","authors":"C. Goldhaber","doi":"10.1353/hph.2024.a932355","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"abstract: There is little consensus about whether Kant intends his Critique of Pure Reason to change the mind of a skeptical empiricist such as Hume. I challenge a common assumption made by both sides of the debate. This is the thought that Kant can convince skeptics only if he does not beg the question against them. Surprisingly, I argue, that is not how Kant sees things. On Kant’s view, skeptical empiricism is an inherently unstable and unsatisfying position, which skeptics cannot help wanting to escape. Kant’s Critique , and especially its Transcendental Deduction, offers thinkers like Hume an appealing means of escape, by explaining a possible relation of the mind to the objects of knowledge that skeptics have overlooked. On Kant’s view of skeptics as inherently dissatisfied with their position, the offer of an explanation can change their minds while neither refuting nor appealing to their skeptical empiricism.","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Kant’s Offer to the Skeptical Empiricist\",\"authors\":\"C. Goldhaber\",\"doi\":\"10.1353/hph.2024.a932355\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"abstract: There is little consensus about whether Kant intends his Critique of Pure Reason to change the mind of a skeptical empiricist such as Hume. I challenge a common assumption made by both sides of the debate. This is the thought that Kant can convince skeptics only if he does not beg the question against them. Surprisingly, I argue, that is not how Kant sees things. On Kant’s view, skeptical empiricism is an inherently unstable and unsatisfying position, which skeptics cannot help wanting to escape. Kant’s Critique , and especially its Transcendental Deduction, offers thinkers like Hume an appealing means of escape, by explaining a possible relation of the mind to the objects of knowledge that skeptics have overlooked. On Kant’s view of skeptics as inherently dissatisfied with their position, the offer of an explanation can change their minds while neither refuting nor appealing to their skeptical empiricism.\",\"PeriodicalId\":46448,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2024.a932355\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2024.a932355","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
abstract: There is little consensus about whether Kant intends his Critique of Pure Reason to change the mind of a skeptical empiricist such as Hume. I challenge a common assumption made by both sides of the debate. This is the thought that Kant can convince skeptics only if he does not beg the question against them. Surprisingly, I argue, that is not how Kant sees things. On Kant’s view, skeptical empiricism is an inherently unstable and unsatisfying position, which skeptics cannot help wanting to escape. Kant’s Critique , and especially its Transcendental Deduction, offers thinkers like Hume an appealing means of escape, by explaining a possible relation of the mind to the objects of knowledge that skeptics have overlooked. On Kant’s view of skeptics as inherently dissatisfied with their position, the offer of an explanation can change their minds while neither refuting nor appealing to their skeptical empiricism.
期刊介绍:
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