随机分区、潜力、价值和外部性

IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-07-14 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2024.06.004
André Casajus , Yukihiko Funaki , Frank Huettner
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引用次数: 0

摘要

夏普利值等于棋手对棋局潜力的贡献。潜力是一个博弈最自然的单数总结,可以计算为随机分配的玩家的预期累积价值。这种计算方法整合了所有博弈者的联盟形成,并很容易扩展到具有外部性的博弈。我们研究了可以用这种方法计算的有外部性博弈的势函数。事实证明,与马乔-斯塔德勒等人(2007,《经济理论杂志》,135, 339-356)提出的 MPW 解决方案相对应的势函数在以下意义上是唯一的。它是作为随机分区的预期累积价值得到的,它概括了无外部性博弈的潜力,而且即使在存在外部性的情况下,它也能诱导出一个满足空玩家属性的解。
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Random partitions, potential, value, and externalities

The Shapley value equals a player's contribution to the potential of a game. The potential is a most natural one-number summary of a game, which can be computed as the expected accumulated worth of a random partition of the players. This computation integrates the coalition formation of all players and readily extends to games with externalities. We investigate those potential functions for games with externalities that can be computed this way. It turns out that the potential that corresponds to the MPW solution introduced by Macho-Stadler et al. (2007, J. Econ. Theory 135, 339–356) is unique in the following sense. It is obtained as the expected accumulated worth of a random partition, it generalizes the potential for games without externalities, and it induces a solution that satisfies the null player property even in the presence of externalities.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
9.10%
发文量
148
期刊介绍: Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology
期刊最新文献
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