内在意识:注意力的论证

IF 1.1 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-07-20 DOI:10.1007/s11098-024-02188-6
Anna Giustina, Uriah Kriegel
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们提出了一个支持 "意识原则 "的新论点。"意识原则 "是指一个人总是能意识到自己同时存在的意识状态。从形式上讲,这个论点是这样的:(1)你的意识状态是这样的:你可以关注它们,而无需采取任何超出单纯的注意力转移之外的行动;但是(2)除非你已经意识到某件事情,否则你不可能在不采取任何超出单纯的注意力转移之外的行动的情况下关注该事物;因此,(3)你的意识状态是这样的:你意识到它们。我们首先更全面地介绍了 "意识原理"(§ 1),并解释了 "仅仅转移注意力 "这一关键概念(§ 2)。然后,我们首先以直观的形式(§ 3),然后以更正式的形式(§ 4),更充分地展开论证,最后回答一系列反对意见(§ 5-7)。
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Inner awareness: the argument from attention

We present a new argument in favor of the Awareness Principle, the principle that one is always aware of one’s concurrent conscious states. Informally, the argument is this: (1) Your conscious states are such that you can attend to them without undertaking any action beyond mere shift of attention; but (2) You cannot come to attend to something without undertaking any action beyond mere shift of attention unless you are already aware of that thing; so, (3) Your conscious states are such that you are aware of them. We open by introducing more fully the Awareness Principle (§ 1) and explicating the crucial notion of “mere shift of attention” (§ 2). We then develop the argument more fully, first in an intuitive form (§ 3) and then more formally (§ 4), before replying to a series of objections (§§ 5–7).

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来源期刊
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
7.70%
发文量
127
期刊介绍: Philosophical Studies was founded in 1950 by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars to provide a periodical dedicated to work in analytic philosophy. The journal remains devoted to the publication of papers in exclusively analytic philosophy. Papers applying formal techniques to philosophical problems are welcome. The principal aim is to publish articles that are models of clarity and precision in dealing with significant philosophical issues. It is intended that readers of the journal will be kept abreast of the central issues and problems of contemporary analytic philosophy. Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.
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