凝聚力、意识形态和宽容

Patrick Allmis
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引用次数: 0

摘要

意识形态不同的代理人往往会结成联盟来实现他们的目标。矛盾的是,意识形态相似的代理人往往是对手。在本文中,意识形态异质的代理人会选择其邻居的意识形态构成、容忍度,并投资于联系。由此产生的加权网络描述了盟友、对手和优势。与对手的争端决定了利益,而利益会随着代理人的实力和凝聚力而增加。具有凝聚力的代理与对手之间的相互盟友数量较少。在非均衡状态下,当凝聚力足够有效时,网络就会出现隔离,一些代理人会容忍意识形态上距离较远的类型来反对距离较近的类型。
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Cohesion, Ideology, and Tolerance
Agents with different ideologies often form alliances to achieve their goals. Paradoxically, ideologically similar agents are often opponents. In this paper, ideologically heterogeneous agents choose the ideological composition of their neighborhood, their tolerance, and invest into connections. The resulting weighted network describes allies, opponents, and strengths. Disputes with opponents determine benefits, which increase in an agent's strength and cohesion. Cohesive agents have fewer mutual allies with opponents. In equilibrium, the network is segregated when cohesion is effective enough and some agents tolerate ideologically distant types to oppose closer ones. Subsidizing connections dampens polarization in societies on the verge of segregation.
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