关于防咝咝声机制

Minghao Pan, Akaki Mamageishvili, Christoph Schlegel
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们证明,在单参数机制设计环境中,唯一不浪费、对称、激励兼容且防止西比勒效应的机制是对称打破平局的第二价格拍卖。因此,如果存在私人信息,抽签或其他并不总是分配给价值最高的投标人的机制就不能防止西比勒效应,也不能与激励相容。
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On sibyl-proof mechanisms
We show that in the single-parameter mechanism design environment, the only non-wasteful, symmetric, incentive compatible and sibyl-proof mechanism is a second price auction with symmetric tie-breaking. Thus, if there is private information, lotteries or other mechanisms that do not always allocate to a highest-value bidder are not sibyl-proof or not incentive compatible.
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