Minghao Pan, Akaki Mamageishvili, Christoph Schlegel
{"title":"关于防咝咝声机制","authors":"Minghao Pan, Akaki Mamageishvili, Christoph Schlegel","doi":"arxiv-2407.14485","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We show that in the single-parameter mechanism design environment, the only\nnon-wasteful, symmetric, incentive compatible and sibyl-proof mechanism is a\nsecond price auction with symmetric tie-breaking. Thus, if there is private\ninformation, lotteries or other mechanisms that do not always allocate to a\nhighest-value bidder are not sibyl-proof or not incentive compatible.","PeriodicalId":501316,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"On sibyl-proof mechanisms\",\"authors\":\"Minghao Pan, Akaki Mamageishvili, Christoph Schlegel\",\"doi\":\"arxiv-2407.14485\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We show that in the single-parameter mechanism design environment, the only\\nnon-wasteful, symmetric, incentive compatible and sibyl-proof mechanism is a\\nsecond price auction with symmetric tie-breaking. Thus, if there is private\\ninformation, lotteries or other mechanisms that do not always allocate to a\\nhighest-value bidder are not sibyl-proof or not incentive compatible.\",\"PeriodicalId\":501316,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory\",\"volume\":\"20 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/arxiv-2407.14485\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2407.14485","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We show that in the single-parameter mechanism design environment, the only
non-wasteful, symmetric, incentive compatible and sibyl-proof mechanism is a
second price auction with symmetric tie-breaking. Thus, if there is private
information, lotteries or other mechanisms that do not always allocate to a
highest-value bidder are not sibyl-proof or not incentive compatible.