Thomas R. Kubick, G. Brandon Lockhart, David C. Mauer
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引用次数: 0
摘要
我们研究了因巨额未实现资本利得税负债而锁定的首席执行官股权如何影响债务合同的成本和限制性。我们发现，当公司首席执行官的税负较大时，公司的贷款利差较低，获得评级上调（下调）的可能性较大（较小）。以 1997 年《税制改革法案》中资本利得税税率的降低作为 CEO 税负的外生冲击，我们发现，减税前税负较高的 CEO 在减税后的贷款利差会急剧上升。当公司盈利能力低、破产风险高以及贷款无担保时，利差的增幅更大。此外，CEO 税负会降低非价格贷款条款的限制性、增加银团规模并降低发行成本。
We examine how locked-in CEO equity attributable to large unrealized capital gains tax liabilities influences the cost and restrictiveness of debt contracts. We find that firms enjoy lower loan spreads and are more (less) likely to receive ratings upgrades (downgrades) when their CEO has a large tax burden. Using the capital gains tax rate decrease in the Tax Reform Act of 1997 as an exogenous shock to CEO tax burdens, we find that CEOs with large tax burdens before the tax cut experience a sharp increase in loan spreads afterward. This increase in spreads is larger when the firm has low profitability, high bankruptcy risk, and when loans are unsecured. Further, CEO tax burdens decrease the restrictiveness of nonprice loan terms, increase syndicate size, and decrease issue costs.
期刊介绍：
Review of Accounting Studies provides an outlet for significant academic research in accounting including theoretical, empirical, and experimental work. The journal is committed to the principle that distinctive scholarship is rigorous. While the editors encourage all forms of research, it must contribute to the discipline of accounting. The Review of Accounting Studies is committed to prompt turnaround on the manuscripts it receives. For the majority of manuscripts the journal will make an accept-reject decision on the first round. Authors will be provided the opportunity to revise accepted manuscripts in response to reviewer and editor comments; however, discretion over such manuscripts resides principally with the authors. An editorial revise and resubmit decision is reserved for new submissions which are not acceptable in their current version, but for which the editor sees a clear path of changes which would make the manuscript publishable. Officially cited as: Rev Account Stud
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