{"title":"提供生态系统服务的压力群体之间的竞争对林分最佳轮伐期的影响","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.forpol.2024.103300","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>A significant segment of the variety of forest ecosystem services is neither demanded nor supplied through market exchange, but is provided essentially through political processes. In this paper, we present an economic analysis of forest stand management under consideration of politically provided ecosystem services. In this, competition between pressure groups seeking to grasp privileges plays an important role. We extend the Hartman model with elements of the pressure group models. We incorporate the amount of the reward derived from the political contest, the effectiveness factor of the forest owner in the political competition and the lobbying investment made by the forest owner. We show that the competition amongst pressure groups has a profound impact on the optimal rotation length compared to the classical solution by Faustmann. We discuss, how the competition amongst pressure groups shapes the optimal rotation length when forest stand management provides multiple forest ecosystem services. We also address the levels of the reward derived from the political contest and the effectiveness factor in the context of the urban–rural interface.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":12451,"journal":{"name":"Forest Policy and Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The influence of the competition amongst pressure groups to provide ecosystem services on the optimal rotation length of forest stands\",\"authors\":\"\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.forpol.2024.103300\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>A significant segment of the variety of forest ecosystem services is neither demanded nor supplied through market exchange, but is provided essentially through political processes. In this paper, we present an economic analysis of forest stand management under consideration of politically provided ecosystem services. In this, competition between pressure groups seeking to grasp privileges plays an important role. We extend the Hartman model with elements of the pressure group models. We incorporate the amount of the reward derived from the political contest, the effectiveness factor of the forest owner in the political competition and the lobbying investment made by the forest owner. We show that the competition amongst pressure groups has a profound impact on the optimal rotation length compared to the classical solution by Faustmann. We discuss, how the competition amongst pressure groups shapes the optimal rotation length when forest stand management provides multiple forest ecosystem services. We also address the levels of the reward derived from the political contest and the effectiveness factor in the context of the urban–rural interface.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":12451,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Forest Policy and Economics\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Forest Policy and Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"97\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1389934124001540\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"农林科学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Forest Policy and Economics","FirstCategoryId":"97","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1389934124001540","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"农林科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
The influence of the competition amongst pressure groups to provide ecosystem services on the optimal rotation length of forest stands
A significant segment of the variety of forest ecosystem services is neither demanded nor supplied through market exchange, but is provided essentially through political processes. In this paper, we present an economic analysis of forest stand management under consideration of politically provided ecosystem services. In this, competition between pressure groups seeking to grasp privileges plays an important role. We extend the Hartman model with elements of the pressure group models. We incorporate the amount of the reward derived from the political contest, the effectiveness factor of the forest owner in the political competition and the lobbying investment made by the forest owner. We show that the competition amongst pressure groups has a profound impact on the optimal rotation length compared to the classical solution by Faustmann. We discuss, how the competition amongst pressure groups shapes the optimal rotation length when forest stand management provides multiple forest ecosystem services. We also address the levels of the reward derived from the political contest and the effectiveness factor in the context of the urban–rural interface.
期刊介绍:
Forest Policy and Economics is a leading scientific journal that publishes peer-reviewed policy and economics research relating to forests, forested landscapes, forest-related industries, and other forest-relevant land uses. It also welcomes contributions from other social sciences and humanities perspectives that make clear theoretical, conceptual and methodological contributions to the existing state-of-the-art literature on forests and related land use systems. These disciplines include, but are not limited to, sociology, anthropology, human geography, history, jurisprudence, planning, development studies, and psychology research on forests. Forest Policy and Economics is global in scope and publishes multiple article types of high scientific standard. Acceptance for publication is subject to a double-blind peer-review process.