Bouke Klein Teeselink, Dennie van Dolder, Martijn J. van den Assem, Jason D. Dana
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We examine high-stakes strategic choice using more than 40 years of data from the American TV game show . In every episode, contestants play the , a sequential game of perfect information for which the optimal strategy can be found through backward induction. We find that contestants systematically deviate from the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. These departures from optimality are well explained by a modified agent quantal response model that allows for limited foresight. The results suggest that many contestants simplify the decision problem by adopting a myopic representation, and optimize their chances of beating the next contestant only. In line with learning, contestants' choices improve over the course of our sample period.
期刊介绍：
Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology
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