不公平规避下的外卖和就餐服务业务

Sijia Zeng, Wei Hu, Xiaochen Sun
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摘要

外卖服务所带来的利润日益成为餐厅营业收入的重要组成部分。由于外卖服务通常依赖于第三方平台,且外卖服务的成本与正餐服务的成本存在诸多差异。我们将重点放在同时提供就餐服务和外卖服务的餐厅上,并将服务系统建模为两阶段串联排队系统。我们研究了餐厅每个阶段的最佳容量水平。此外,由于两种服务之间存在价格差异,我们的模型还对不公平厌恶进行了研究。我们根据消费者的需求弹性研究了对称和非对称的不公平厌恶。通过对理论模型的分析,我们得出了一些结论:首先,最优服务容量由两部分组成,即基础容量和安全容量。而等待时间滞后造成的损失等于到达率波动造成的资源浪费。其次,当顾客真正渴望用餐时,即使高价会导致严重的不公平厌恶,但在高收入的服务渠道,餐厅总能通过提高价格获得更多收益。而当顾客对餐厅和其他餐厅漠不关心时,价格差距就会导致收入减少。第三,降低顾客的敏感度有助于全面提高经营利润。市场环境对选择最佳服务水平起着决定性作用。
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Take-away and sit-down service operations under inequity aversion
Profit contributed by take-away service has become an increasingly essential element of the restaurant operating revenue. Since take-away service usually relies on the third-party platform and there are many differences between the cost of take-away service and that of sit-down service. We focus on the restaurant which provides both sit-down service and take-away service, the service system is modeled as a two-stage tandem queueing system. We study the restaurant’s optimal capacity level for each stage. Besides, as there exist price difference between the two services, inequity aversion is also investigaed in our model. We study symmetrical and asymmetrical inequity aversion according to consumers’elasity of demand. Through analysis of theoretical model, we get some conclusions: first, the optimal service capacity consists of two parts, base capacity and safety capacity. And the loss resulted from waiting time lag is equal to the waste of resources caused by fluctuations in arrival rate. Second, when customers really long for the restaurant, even if high price will lead to severe inequity aversion, restaurant can always earn more by raising the price in service channel with high revenue. While when customers are indifferent of the restaurant and the others, the price gap is meant to result in revenue decrease. Third, reduction in customers’ susceptibility can help to enhance operation profit in general. Market environment plays a decisive role in choosing the optimal service level.
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