通过 "回溯 "针对大型语言模型的数据窃取攻击

Jiaming He, Guanyu Hou, Xinyue Jia, Yangyang Chen, Wenqi Liao, Yinhang Zhou, Rang Zhou
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摘要

大型语言模型(LLM)受到了广泛关注,并越来越多地应用于各个领域。然而,这一技术飞跃带来了严重的安全和隐私问题。本文通过引入一种自适应方法,从预先训练好的 LLMs 中通过回溯提取隐私训练数据,探索了一种新的数据窃取攻击方法。我们的方法主要针对模型定制的场景,分两个阶段进行,包括后门训练和后门激活,这样就可以在事先不了解模型架构或训练数据的情况下提取隐私信息。在模型定制阶段,攻击者通过毒化一小部分训练数据集,将后门注入预先训练好的 LLM。在推理阶段,攻击者可以通过加入预定义的后门触发器,从第三方知识数据库中提取私人信息。我们的方法利用了 LLM 的定制过程,注入了一个隐秘的后门,可以在部署后触发以检索私人数据。我们通过大量实验证明了我们提出的攻击方法的有效性,并取得了显著的攻击成功率。广泛的实验证明了我们的窃取攻击在流行的 LLM 架构中的有效性,以及在正常推理过程中的隐蔽性。
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Data Stealing Attacks against Large Language Models via Backdooring
Large language models (LLMs) have gained immense attention and are being increasingly applied in various domains. However, this technological leap forward poses serious security and privacy concerns. This paper explores a novel approach to data stealing attacks by introducing an adaptive method to extract private training data from pre-trained LLMs via backdooring. Our method mainly focuses on the scenario of model customization and is conducted in two phases, including backdoor training and backdoor activation, which allow for the extraction of private information without prior knowledge of the model’s architecture or training data. During the model customization stage, attackers inject the backdoor into the pre-trained LLM by poisoning a small ratio of the training dataset. During the inference stage, attackers can extract private information from the third-party knowledge database by incorporating the pre-defined backdoor trigger. Our method leverages the customization process of LLMs, injecting a stealthy backdoor that can be triggered after deployment to retrieve private data. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed attack through extensive experiments, achieving a notable attack success rate. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our stealing attack in popular LLM architectures, as well as stealthiness during normal inference.
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