喹宁饮食质量第一部分

IF 0.2 4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY VOPROSY FILOSOFII Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI:10.21146/0042-8744-2024-7-131-138
Keith Frankish, Maxim D. Gorbachev
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文是基思-弗兰基什(Keith Frankish)所著《饮食质点》(Quining Diet Qualia)一文的第一部分,文章提出了一个问题:我们能否为现象意识理论找到一个各方都能接受的中性解释?经典的 "质点 "概念认为质点是内在的、不可言说的和主观的,但它并不能达到这个目的,但人们普遍认为一种淡化的 "饮食 "概念可以达到这个目的。作者认为这是错误的,"节食 "的质点概念没有独特的内容。在剥离了质点的内在性、不可言说性和主观性之后,就不会再有现象学的残留物了。因此,如果我们拒绝经典质点现实主义,我们就应该接受需要解释的只是 "零 "质点--我们判断我们的经验具有经典质点的倾向。用丹尼特的话说,饮食质点应该被淬火。
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Quining Diet Qualia Part I
This is the first part of the article by Keith Frankish Quining Diet Qualia, which asks whether we can identify a neutral explanandum for theories of phenomenal consciousness, acceptable to all sides. The “classic” conception of qualia, on which qualia are intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective, will not serve this purpose, but it is widely assumed that a watered-down “diet” conception will. The author argues that this is wrong and that the diet notion of qualia has no distinctive content. There is no phenomenal residue left when qualia are stripped of their intrinsicality, ineffability, and subjectivity. Thus, if we reject classic qualia realism, we should accept that all that needs explaining are “zero” qualia – our dispositions to judge that our experiences have classic qualia. Diet qualia should, in Dennett’s phrase, be quined.
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来源期刊
VOPROSY FILOSOFII
VOPROSY FILOSOFII PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
0.40
自引率
50.00%
发文量
100
期刊介绍: "Вопросы философии" - академическое научное издание, центральный философский журнал в России. В настоящее время является органом Президиума Российской Академии Наук. Журнал "Вопросы философии" исторически тесно связан с Институтом философии РАН. Выходит ежемесячно. Журнал был основан в июле 1947 г. Интернет-версия журнала запущена в мае 2009 года.
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