TSO-DSO 协调灵活性市场中的战略行为:纳什均衡与效率分析

IF 4.8 2区 工程技术 Q2 ENERGY & FUELS Sustainable Energy Grids & Networks Pub Date : 2024-07-17 DOI:10.1016/j.segan.2024.101476
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摘要

本文研究了输电系统运营商-配电系统运营商协调灵活性市场的设计如何促进灵活性服务提供商(FSP)的战略行为。本文考虑了输电和配电系统运营商采购灵活性服务的多种灵活性市场模式,即:共同(联合)市场、分散市场和连续多级市场。考虑到这些市场模型,本文引入了三种非合作博弈,以研究其中的战略竞标和 FSP 之间的互动。然后,就所开发博弈中纳什均衡点(NEs)的存在性和唯一性得出了详细结论,包括推导出由此产生的纳什均衡点和相应的无政府价格的闭式表达式,从而捕捉到 FSP 的战略竞价对市场效率的影响。分析考虑了三种不同的使用情况--首先是在双头垄断的情况下,然后是在多头垄断的情况下,这三种情况分别代表了什么情况:(1) 存在充足的灵活容量(FSP 提供充足的灵活容量,系统间存在充足的互联/并网容量);(2) 参与者拥有稀缺的灵活容量;(3) 系统间存在限制性接口容量。一项考虑到互联输配电系统和多个固定电网服务商的案例研究证实了上述分析结果。研究结果表明,市场参与者有动力设定高于其边际成本的投标价格,从而降低了市场效率。在可用灵活容量有限、存在限制性线路限制或市场分散的情况下,这种情况会更加明显,因此需要增加网络投资和创建联合灵活市场模式。
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Strategic behavior in TSO-DSO coordinated flexibility markets: A Nash equilibrium and efficiency analysis

This paper investigates the way in which the design of a TSO-DSO coordinated flexibility market can enable strategic behavior by flexibility service providers (FSPs). Multiple flexibility market models are considered for the procurement of flexibility services by transmission and distribution system operators, namely: a common (joint) market, a fragmented market, and a sequential multi-level market. Considering these market models, three non-cooperative games are introduced to investigate the strategic bidding and interaction between FSPs therein. Detailed conclusions are then drawn on the existence and uniqueness of Nash Equilibria (NEs) in the developed games, including derivations of closed-form expressions of the resulting NEs and corresponding price-of-anarchy, capturing the FSPs’ strategic bidding impact on the markets’ efficiency. The analysis considers – first in a duopoly setting, then with multiple players – three different use cases representing when: (1) a sufficient flexible capacity exists (sufficient flexibility offered from the FSPs and adequate interconnection/grid capacity between systems); (2) participants have a scarce flexibility capacity; and (3) a restrictive interface capacity exists between the systems. A case study considering an interconnected transmission–distribution system and multiple FSPs corroborates the analytical findings. The obtained results show that market participants have incentives to set bid prices greater than their marginal costs, thus decreasing the markets’ efficiency. This aspect is shown to be more pronounced when the available flexible capacity is limited, a restrictive line limit is present, or when the market is fragmented, thus supporting the need for additional network investments and the creation of joint flexibility market formats.

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来源期刊
Sustainable Energy Grids & Networks
Sustainable Energy Grids & Networks Energy-Energy Engineering and Power Technology
CiteScore
7.90
自引率
13.00%
发文量
206
审稿时长
49 days
期刊介绍: Sustainable Energy, Grids and Networks (SEGAN)is an international peer-reviewed publication for theoretical and applied research dealing with energy, information grids and power networks, including smart grids from super to micro grid scales. SEGAN welcomes papers describing fundamental advances in mathematical, statistical or computational methods with application to power and energy systems, as well as papers on applications, computation and modeling in the areas of electrical and energy systems with coupled information and communication technologies.
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