{"title":"保护隐私的线段相交双方计算","authors":"Sorour Sheidani, Alireza Zarei","doi":"10.1007/s10207-024-00895-z","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>By considering maps and routes as sequences of line segments, their intersections can be computed to find out useful information like the possibility of collision in a military area where the parties do not trust each other. At the first glance, finding the coordinates of the intersections is seemed impossible to be solved securely since having coordinates of two intersection points on the same line reveals the passing line. In this paper, we solve this problem by suggesting a secure two-party protocol in presence of passive adversaries. Additionally, regarding the fact that in some cases, the fixedness of the inputs of the parties in classic security models is an unrealistic assumption, we define the new concept of input-adaptive security and show that our method is secure against such an adversary who is able to select his inputs adaptively. In addition to serve different approaches like oblivious transfer and sometimes homomorphic encryption, we also employ some tricks to prevent the distribution of harmful information between specific parties to achieve our intended security level. We provide formal proofs to show the security of our protocol. Time complexity analysis and implementations show that our protocol finds the intersections in feasible time of <span>\\({\\mathcal {O}}(n \\log n)\\)</span> and indicate that our protocol is as good as the unsecure optimal method of line segment intersection computation. In comparison, previous methods require <span>\\(O(n^2)\\)</span> to only detect the existence of intersection between two sets of <i>n</i> line segments and are unable to find the coordinates of the intersections.</p>","PeriodicalId":50316,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Information Security","volume":"44 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Privacy-preserving two-party computation of line segment intersection\",\"authors\":\"Sorour Sheidani, Alireza Zarei\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s10207-024-00895-z\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>By considering maps and routes as sequences of line segments, their intersections can be computed to find out useful information like the possibility of collision in a military area where the parties do not trust each other. At the first glance, finding the coordinates of the intersections is seemed impossible to be solved securely since having coordinates of two intersection points on the same line reveals the passing line. In this paper, we solve this problem by suggesting a secure two-party protocol in presence of passive adversaries. Additionally, regarding the fact that in some cases, the fixedness of the inputs of the parties in classic security models is an unrealistic assumption, we define the new concept of input-adaptive security and show that our method is secure against such an adversary who is able to select his inputs adaptively. In addition to serve different approaches like oblivious transfer and sometimes homomorphic encryption, we also employ some tricks to prevent the distribution of harmful information between specific parties to achieve our intended security level. We provide formal proofs to show the security of our protocol. Time complexity analysis and implementations show that our protocol finds the intersections in feasible time of <span>\\\\({\\\\mathcal {O}}(n \\\\log n)\\\\)</span> and indicate that our protocol is as good as the unsecure optimal method of line segment intersection computation. In comparison, previous methods require <span>\\\\(O(n^2)\\\\)</span> to only detect the existence of intersection between two sets of <i>n</i> line segments and are unable to find the coordinates of the intersections.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":50316,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Journal of Information Security\",\"volume\":\"44 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-31\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Journal of Information Security\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"94\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-024-00895-z\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"计算机科学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Information Security","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-024-00895-z","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
通过将地图和路线视为线段序列,可以计算出它们的交叉点,从而找出有用的信息,例如在双方互不信任的军事区域发生碰撞的可能性。乍一看,找到交叉点的坐标似乎不可能安全解决,因为在同一条直线上的两个交叉点的坐标会显示经过的直线。在本文中,我们提出了一种在被动对手存在的情况下安全的两方协议,从而解决了这一问题。此外,在某些情况下,经典安全模型中双方输入的固定性是一个不切实际的假设,针对这一事实,我们定义了输入自适应安全这一新概念,并证明我们的方法可以安全地对抗能够自适应选择输入的对手。除了采用不同的方法(如遗忘传输和同态加密),我们还采用了一些技巧来防止有害信息在特定各方之间传播,以达到我们预期的安全等级。我们提供了正式的证明来展示我们协议的安全性。时间复杂性分析和实现表明,我们的协议可以在 \({mathcal {O}}(n \log n)\) 的可行时间内找到交点,并且表明我们的协议与不安全的最优线段交点计算方法一样好。相比之下,之前的方法需要\(O(n^2)\)的时间才能检测出两组 n 条线段之间是否存在交集,并且无法找到交集的坐标。
Privacy-preserving two-party computation of line segment intersection
By considering maps and routes as sequences of line segments, their intersections can be computed to find out useful information like the possibility of collision in a military area where the parties do not trust each other. At the first glance, finding the coordinates of the intersections is seemed impossible to be solved securely since having coordinates of two intersection points on the same line reveals the passing line. In this paper, we solve this problem by suggesting a secure two-party protocol in presence of passive adversaries. Additionally, regarding the fact that in some cases, the fixedness of the inputs of the parties in classic security models is an unrealistic assumption, we define the new concept of input-adaptive security and show that our method is secure against such an adversary who is able to select his inputs adaptively. In addition to serve different approaches like oblivious transfer and sometimes homomorphic encryption, we also employ some tricks to prevent the distribution of harmful information between specific parties to achieve our intended security level. We provide formal proofs to show the security of our protocol. Time complexity analysis and implementations show that our protocol finds the intersections in feasible time of \({\mathcal {O}}(n \log n)\) and indicate that our protocol is as good as the unsecure optimal method of line segment intersection computation. In comparison, previous methods require \(O(n^2)\) to only detect the existence of intersection between two sets of n line segments and are unable to find the coordinates of the intersections.
期刊介绍:
The International Journal of Information Security is an English language periodical on research in information security which offers prompt publication of important technical work, whether theoretical, applicable, or related to implementation.
Coverage includes system security: intrusion detection, secure end systems, secure operating systems, database security, security infrastructures, security evaluation; network security: Internet security, firewalls, mobile security, security agents, protocols, anti-virus and anti-hacker measures; content protection: watermarking, software protection, tamper resistant software; applications: electronic commerce, government, health, telecommunications, mobility.