在线冲突披露如何支持执法?来自个人财务披露和公共腐败的证据

Alexandra A. Scherf
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摘要

摘要 公共腐败是全世界民主国家都关注的问题。在美国,各州通过在网上公布公职人员的个人财务披露(PFDs)来应对这一问题。PFD 是一种利益冲突披露,旨在通过记录官员的经济利益与公共责任之间的重叠,缓解公民个人与政府官员之间的代理冲突。本文探讨了在线 PFD 是否以及如何支持反腐执法。我提出了一个风格化的模型,说明在线 PFD 如何引导调查人员提高案件移交的数量和质量。从实证角度看,我发现地方官员的在线 PFD 与转介率的提高和转介后起诉的可能性增加有关。我对联邦检察官、记者和道德委员会进行了 126 次实地采访,以了解这些结果背后的机制。我的结论是,在线 PFD 降低了执法人员获取信息的成本,从而支持了对地方腐败的执法。
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How Do Online Conflict Disclosures Support Enforcement? Evidence from Personal Financial Disclosures and Public Corruption
ABSTRACT Public corruption is a concern for democracies around the world. In the U.S., states have responded to this issue by publishing personal financial disclosures (PFDs) for public officials online. PFDs are a conflict-of-interest disclosure designed to relieve agency conflicts between private citizens and government officials by documenting overlaps between officials’ financial interests and public responsibilities. This paper explores whether and how online PFD supports anticorruption enforcement. I present a stylized model illustrating how online PFD leads investigators to increase case referral volume and quality. Empirically, I find that online PFD for local officials is associated with increased referral rates and greater likelihoods of prosecution conditional on referral. I conduct 126 field interviews of federal prosecutors, journalists, and ethics commissions to understand the mechanisms behind these results. I conclude that online PFD supports the enforcement of local corruption by reducing disclosure acquisition costs for enforcement agents.
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