{"title":"跳上浪潮,跳下泰坦尼克号:两级投票中投票率的实验研究","authors":"Yoichi Hizen, Kazuya Kikuchi, Yukio Koriyama, Takehito Masuda","doi":"arxiv-2408.00265","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We experimentally study voter turnout in two-tier elections when the\nelectorate consists of multiple groups, such as states. Votes are aggregated\nwithin the groups by the winner-take-all rule or the proportional rule, and the\ngroup-level decisions are combined to determine the winner. We observe that,\ncompared with the theoretical prediction, turnout is significantly lower in the\nminority camp (the Titanic effect) and significantly higher in the majority\ncamp (the behavioral bandwagon effect), and these effects are stronger under\nthe proportional rule than under the winner-take-all rule. As a result, the\ndistribution of voter welfare becomes more unequal than theoretically\npredicted, and this welfare effect is stronger under the proportional rule than\nunder the winner-take-all rule.","PeriodicalId":501273,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - General Economics","volume":"75 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Jumping on the bandwagon and off the Titanic: an experimental study of turnout in two-tier voting\",\"authors\":\"Yoichi Hizen, Kazuya Kikuchi, Yukio Koriyama, Takehito Masuda\",\"doi\":\"arxiv-2408.00265\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We experimentally study voter turnout in two-tier elections when the\\nelectorate consists of multiple groups, such as states. Votes are aggregated\\nwithin the groups by the winner-take-all rule or the proportional rule, and the\\ngroup-level decisions are combined to determine the winner. We observe that,\\ncompared with the theoretical prediction, turnout is significantly lower in the\\nminority camp (the Titanic effect) and significantly higher in the majority\\ncamp (the behavioral bandwagon effect), and these effects are stronger under\\nthe proportional rule than under the winner-take-all rule. As a result, the\\ndistribution of voter welfare becomes more unequal than theoretically\\npredicted, and this welfare effect is stronger under the proportional rule than\\nunder the winner-take-all rule.\",\"PeriodicalId\":501273,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"arXiv - ECON - General Economics\",\"volume\":\"75 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-08-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"arXiv - ECON - General Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.00265\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - ECON - General Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.00265","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Jumping on the bandwagon and off the Titanic: an experimental study of turnout in two-tier voting
We experimentally study voter turnout in two-tier elections when the
electorate consists of multiple groups, such as states. Votes are aggregated
within the groups by the winner-take-all rule or the proportional rule, and the
group-level decisions are combined to determine the winner. We observe that,
compared with the theoretical prediction, turnout is significantly lower in the
minority camp (the Titanic effect) and significantly higher in the majority
camp (the behavioral bandwagon effect), and these effects are stronger under
the proportional rule than under the winner-take-all rule. As a result, the
distribution of voter welfare becomes more unequal than theoretically
predicted, and this welfare effect is stronger under the proportional rule than
under the winner-take-all rule.