量子差分中间人攻击及其在轻量级密码中的一些应用

IF 4.4 Q1 OPTICS Advanced quantum technologies Pub Date : 2024-08-07 DOI:10.1002/qute.202400157
Yin-Song Xu, Bin-Bin Cai, Zheng Yuan, Su-Juan Qin, Fei Gao, Qiao-Yan Wen
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Besides, the time complexity of the attack can be reduced by at least a factor of <span></span><math>\n <semantics>\n <msup>\n <mn>2</mn>\n <mrow>\n <mo>(</mo>\n <mfenced>\n <mrow>\n <msub>\n <mi>k</mi>\n <mrow>\n <mi>i</mi>\n <mi>n</mi>\n </mrow>\n </msub>\n <mo>∪</mo>\n <msub>\n <mi>k</mi>\n <mrow>\n <mi>o</mi>\n <mi>u</mi>\n <mi>t</mi>\n </mrow>\n </msub>\n </mrow>\n </mfenced>\n <mo>−</mo>\n <mi>n</mi>\n <mo>)</mo>\n <mo>/</mo>\n <mn>2</mn>\n </mrow>\n </msup>\n <annotation>${2^{({\\left| {{k_{in}} \\cup {k_{out}}} \\right| } - n)/2}}$</annotation>\n </semantics></math> (<span></span><math>\n <semantics>\n <mfenced>\n <mrow>\n <msub>\n <mi>k</mi>\n <mrow>\n <mi>i</mi>\n <mi>n</mi>\n </mrow>\n </msub>\n <mo>∪</mo>\n <msub>\n <mi>k</mi>\n <mrow>\n <mi>o</mi>\n <mi>u</mi>\n <mi>t</mi>\n </mrow>\n </msub>\n </mrow>\n </mfenced>\n <annotation>${{\\left| {{k_{in}} \\cup {k_{out}}} \\right| }}$</annotation>\n </semantics></math> is the guessed key length and <span></span><math>\n <semantics>\n <mi>n</mi>\n <annotation>$n$</annotation>\n </semantics></math> is the block size) compared to the first quantum differential attack proposed by Kaplan et al. at ToSC 2016. 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引用次数: 0

摘要

在 CRYPTO 2023 大会上,Boura 等人提出了一种新的密码分析技术--差分中间相遇(MITM)攻击。他们利用 MITM 技术使差分攻击的密钥恢复步骤更加高效。在这项研究中,利用嵌套量子搜索算法提出了一种量子差分中间见面攻击,与经典版本相比,它可以实现高达四倍的速度提升。此外,与 Kaplan 等人在 ToSC 2016 上首次提出的量子差分攻击相比,该攻击的时间复杂度至少可以降低(为猜测的密钥长度,为块大小)倍。最后,为了证明我们的攻击效率,我们将其应用于两个减少轮数的轻量级块密码 PIPO 和 SIMON,以评估它们的量子后安全性。在攻击相同轮数的情况下,我们的攻击的时间复杂度明显低于经典攻击。与 Schrottenloher 在 CRYPTO 2023 上提出的最佳量子攻击相比,对于 8 轮 PIPO-128,我们的攻击大大提高了效率,将时间复杂度从降低到 ,将所需的 qRAM 大小减少了倍,获得的数据复杂度也从。对于 19 轮 SIMON-32-64,与其他量子攻击相比,这里的时间复杂度将是而不是,而且与使用 Grover-meets-Simon 技术相比,该攻击可以针对更多轮。
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Quantum Differential Meet-In-The-Middle Attack and Some Applications to Lightweight Ciphers

At CRYPTO 2023, Boura et al. proposed a new cryptanalysis technique, differential meet-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. They used MITM technique to make the key recovery step of a differential attack more efficient. In this study, a quantum differential meet-in-the-middle attack is proposed by using nested quantum search algorithm, which can achieve up to a quadratic speed-up compared to the classical version. Besides, the time complexity of the attack can be reduced by at least a factor of 2 ( k i n k o u t n ) / 2 ${2^{({\left| {{k_{in}} \cup {k_{out}}} \right| } - n)/2}}$ ( k i n k o u t ${{\left| {{k_{in}} \cup {k_{out}}} \right| }}$ is the guessed key length and n $n$ is the block size) compared to the first quantum differential attack proposed by Kaplan et al. at ToSC 2016. Finally, to demonstrate the efficiency of our attack, it is applied to two reduced-round lightweight block ciphers, PIPO and SIMON, to evaluate their post-quantum security. When attacking the same number of rounds, the time complexity of our attack is significantly lower than that of classical attacks. For the 8-round PIPO-128, the attack significantly improves efficiency, reducing the time complexity from 2 64 + 2 60.94 $2^{64} + 2^{60.94}$ to 2 60.48 $2^{60.48}$ , cutting down the required qRAM size by a factor of 2 14 $2^{14}$ and obtaining the data complexity 2 57 $2^{57}$ instead of 2 64 $2^{64}$ compared to the best quantum attack proposed by Schrottenloher at CRYPTO 2023. For the 19-round SIMON-32-64, the time complexity here will be 2 31.68 $2^{31.68}$ instead of 2 33.39 $2^{33.39}$ compared to the other quantum attack, and the attack can target more rounds than using Grover-meets-Simon technique.

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Front Cover: Laser Beam Induced Charge Collection for Defect Mapping and Spin State Readout in Diamond (Adv. Quantum Technol. 12/2024) Inside Front Cover: Numerical Investigation of a Coupled Micropillar - Waveguide System for Integrated Quantum Photonic Circuits (Adv. Quantum Technol. 12/2024) Back Cover: Purity-Assisted Zero-Noise Extrapolation for Quantum Error Mitigation (Adv. Quantum Technol. 12/2024) Issue Information (Adv. Quantum Technol. 12/2024) Issue Information (Adv. Quantum Technol. 11/2024)
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