告别武器:哥伦比亚准军事人员的复员、政治竞争和公共产品

IF 5.1 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Journal of Development Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-03 DOI:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103350
Felipe Coy
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引用次数: 0

摘要

学者们强调了地方精英如何利用其权力攫取民主。这使得选举竞争在政治驱动的武装冲突中尤为脆弱。减少地方精英出于政治动机的暴力行为是否会促进选举竞争?为了探究这个问题,我在哥伦比亚遣散准军事人员的背景下采用了合成差异策略,准军事人员与全国各地的地方精英关系密切。复员后,我观察到竞争加剧。我的研究表明,竞争的加剧与镇压性暴力行为的减少是一致的,这导致那些在没有解散的情况下有可能成为暴力行为受害者的政党参选的可能性增加。不过,我还发现,与精英有关联的政党增加了其选举存在,这表明它们在努力弥补复员造成的损失。最后,我提出的证据表明,在以前由准军事部队控制的地区,公共产品投资发生了转变,现在惠及更广泛的人口阶层,我认为竞争的加剧在一定程度上解释了这一点。
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A Farewell to Arms: Paramilitaries Demobilization, Political Competition and Public Goods in Colombia

Scholars have highlighted how local elites can use their de facto power to capture democracy. This makes electoral competition particularly vulnerable in armed conflicts driven by politics. Would a reduction in politically motivated violence perpetrated by local elites promote electoral competition? To investigate this, I employ a synthetic difference-in-differences strategy within the setting of Colombia’s demobilization of paramilitaries, who were heavily connected with local elites across the country. Following demobilization, I observe an increase in competition. I show that this improvement in competition is consistent with a decrease in repressive violence, leading to an increased likelihood of electoral candidacy for parties that would have potentially been victims of violence in the absence of demobilization. However, I also find that parties associated with elites increased their electoral presence, showing an effort to compensate for the loss produced by demobilization. Finally, I present evidence that public goods investment in territories previously controlled by paramilitaries undergoes a transformation, now benefiting a broader sector of the population, which I argue is partly explained by the increased competition.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
8.30
自引率
4.00%
发文量
126
审稿时长
72 days
期刊介绍: The Journal of Development Economics publishes papers relating to all aspects of economic development - from immediate policy concerns to structural problems of underdevelopment. The emphasis is on quantitative or analytical work, which is relevant as well as intellectually stimulating.
期刊最新文献
Editorial Board On the properties of the two main types of global poverty lines The local human capital costs of oil exploitation Cover more for less: Targeted drug coverage, chronic disease management, and medical spending Corrigendum to “Rural road stimulus and the role of matching mandates on economic recovery in China” [J. Dev. Econ. 166, (January 2024), 103211]
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