关于欺诈和绿色生产认证

IF 1.2 4区 管理学 Q3 ECONOMICS Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-08-07 DOI:10.1111/jems.12609
Carmen Arguedas, Esther Blanco
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们提出了一个关于绿色生产中欺诈和认证的新模型。我们关注的是企业在决定产品的绿色版本还是标准版本时,所采取的广告策略可能包括欺诈。此外,绿色企业可以选择对其产品进行认证,以保证其声明的真实性。这就产生了四种生产-广告可能性(标准、真正的绿色、欺诈性绿色和经认证的绿色),通过这些可能性,我们对欺诈和认证的普遍性有了新的认识。在给定绿色生产成本、认证成本和消费者对标准生产的支付意愿的情况下,我们描述了由此产生的博弈的完全贝叶斯均衡,并对由此产生的博弈的主要参数进行了比较统计。我们发现,认证成本和绿色生产成本的变化会对消费者的信念产生不同的影响,其中认证成本的增加和绿色生产成本的降低会扩大欺诈的可能性。这些新颖的结果对不同的市场结构都是稳健的,并对公共补贴在不附带认证的情况下促进绿色生产的普遍可取性提出了质疑。
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On fraud and certification of green production
We present a novel model of fraud and certification in green production. We focus on settings where firms decide between a green or a standard version of a product together with an advertising strategy that can include fraud. In addition, green firms can choose to certify their production to guarantee the truthfulness of their claims. This results in four production‐advertising possibilities (standard, genuine green, fraudulent green, and certified green), by which we provide new insights about the prevalence of fraud and certification. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the resulting game for given green production costs, certification costs, and consumers' willingness to pay for standard production, and we perform comparative statics for the main parameters of the resulting game. We find that changes in certification and green production costs affect consumers' beliefs differently, whereby increases in certification and decreases in green production costs can broaden the likelihood of fraud. These novel results are robust to different market structures and question the general desirability of public subsidies for promoting green production without accompanying certification.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
5.30%
发文量
43
期刊最新文献
Issue Information Vertical mergers without foreclosure Dynamic competition for customer memberships Forward contracting and the endogenous activity of heterogeneous firms On fraud and certification of green production
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