取决于货架空间需求的零售品类管理:品类领导的有效性

IF 9.8 1区 工程技术 Q1 ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL International Journal of Production Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-10 DOI:10.1016/j.ijpe.2024.109365
Mengchu Wu , Ozgun Caliskan Demirag , Weili Xue , Minghui Xu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

品类负责人制是零售品类管理的一种做法,零售商将某些品类决策权委托给供应商,即品类负责人,以利用供应商的市场专业知识,减少零售商管理品类的工作量。与传统的零售商品类管理相比,我们研究了品类负责人制度的有效性,重点是货架空间容量决策权下放给品类负责人的情况,以及需求取决于货架空间容量的情况。我们的研究考虑了两家相互竞争的制造商,每家制造商都通过一家共同的零售商销售一种可替代产品。我们发现,当零售商的利润分享比例足够高但不过高时,品类负责人制度可以提高零售商和负责人制造商的利润。在货架空间需求弹性的中间值时,利润的提高更为明显。虽然在某些条件下,非队长制造商可能会受到竞争排斥,但当产品的价格或货架空间弹性高度差异化时,就会出现利润和销售额的 "三赢 "结果。零售商从货架空间需求弹性的增加中获益,并倾向于指定弹性较高的制造商为品类领导者。当通过零售商主导的议价框架确定利润分享比例时,零售商通过与制造商依次谈判获得最大利益,从而促使议价能力较低的制造商担任品类负责人。我们的研究结果为制定货架空间弹性需求下的品类管理策略提供了宝贵的见解。
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Retail category management under shelf-space dependent demand: The effectiveness of category captainship

Category captainship is a retail category management practice where the retailer delegates certain category decisions to a vendor, known as the category captain, to leverage the vendor’s market expertise and reduce the retailer’s workload in managing the category. We examine the effectiveness of category captainship compared to traditional retailer category management, focusing on scenarios where shelf space capacity decisions are delegated to the category captain, and demand is dependent on shelf space capacity. Our study considers two competing manufacturers, each selling a substitutable product through a common retailer. We find that when the retailer’s profit-sharing ratio is sufficiently but not excessively high, category captainship can enhance profits for both the retailer and the captain manufacturer. These profit improvements are more pronounced at intermediate values of shelf space elasticity of demand. Although the non-captain manufacturer may suffer from competitive exclusion under certain conditions, “win-win-win” outcomes in profits and sales occur when the products are highly differentiated by price or shelf-space elasticity. The retailer benefits from increasing demand elasticity of shelf space and prefers to designate the manufacturer with the higher elasticity as the category captain. When the profit-sharing ratio is determined through a retailer-led bargaining framework, the retailer benefits most by negotiating sequentially with the manufacturers, inducing the manufacturer with lower bargaining power to take on the category captain role. Our findings provide valuable insights into developing category management strategies under shelf-space elastic demand.

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来源期刊
International Journal of Production Economics
International Journal of Production Economics 管理科学-工程:工业
CiteScore
21.40
自引率
7.50%
发文量
266
审稿时长
52 days
期刊介绍: The International Journal of Production Economics focuses on the interface between engineering and management. It covers all aspects of manufacturing and process industries, as well as production in general. The journal is interdisciplinary, considering activities throughout the product life cycle and material flow cycle. It aims to disseminate knowledge for improving industrial practice and strengthening the theoretical base for decision making. The journal serves as a forum for exchanging ideas and presenting new developments in theory and application, combining academic standards with practical value for industrial applications.
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