International Journal of Production Economics最新文献

Blockchain-embedded carbon emission allowance pledge financing: Resolving maturity mismatch with machine trust and collateral flexibility 嵌入区块链的碳排放额度质押融资：利用机器信任和抵押品灵活性解决期限错配问题

IF 1 1区工程技术 Q1 ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL

International Journal of Production Economics

Pub Date : 2026-01-28 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2026.109947

Ting Yang , Chaoqun Ma , Xianhua Mi , Hui Li , Dongqing Chen

Carbon emission allowances (CEAs), as one of the few “hard assets” of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), hold significant potential for pledge financing. However, due to its compliance period constraints, CEA pledge financing faces fundamental challenges because of the inherent maturity mismatch between short-term compliance cycles (one year) and long-term financing needs (years). To address this issue, this study introduces a blockchain-driven cross-compliance-period CEA pledge financing framework that integrates 1) smart contract-driven automated CEA verification and transfer, 2) high repayment willingness ensured by network-wide broadcasting and tamper-proof records, and 3) a dynamic pledge rate adjustment mechanism. Using 2022–2023 market data, analysis based on the segmented Black-Scholes option pricing model demonstrates that this new framework not only enables enterprises to release carbon assets during the loan period without the need for supplementary collateral, but also achieve a higher pledge rate. However, it is worth noting that elevated market volatility and weak repayment capacity exert a negative influence on the bank’s pledge rate. By leveraging blockchain’s “machine trust” to create a generalizable mechanism for dynamic collateral management, this study offers a novel, technology-driven paradigm that addresses structural maturity mismatches in carbon finance and provides theoretical insights for the design of resilient, long-term green financing systems.

碳排放额度作为中小企业为数不多的“硬资产”之一，具有巨大的质押融资潜力。然而，由于合规期限的限制，CEA质押融资在短期合规周期（1年）和长期融资需求（年）之间存在固有的期限错配，面临着根本性的挑战。为了解决这一问题，本研究引入了一个区块链驱动的跨合规期CEA质押融资框架，该框架集成了1)智能合约驱动的CEA自动验证和转移，2)全网广播和防篡改记录确保的高还款意愿，以及3)动态质押率调整机制。利用2022-2023年的市场数据，基于分段Black-Scholes期权定价模型的分析表明，新框架不仅可以使企业在贷款期内释放碳资产而不需要补充抵押品，而且可以实现更高的质押率。但值得注意的是，市场波动加剧和偿债能力薄弱对银行质押率产生了负面影响。通过利用b区块链的“机器信任”来创建一个动态抵押品管理的通用机制，本研究提供了一个新的、技术驱动的范式，解决了碳融资中的结构性期限错配问题，并为设计有弹性的长期绿色融资系统提供了理论见解。

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引用次数: 0

Impact of power structure on probabilistic selling in supply chains 供应链中权力结构对概率销售的影响

IF 1 1区工程技术 Q1 ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL

International Journal of Production Economics

Pub Date : 2026-01-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2026.109940

Mengying Zhang , Zihao Zhang , Zhennan Yuan , Huan Yu

Opaque products are gaining increasing popularity across a wide range of markets, where sellers and their suppliers may possess asymmetric market power. To study how the distribution of power between supply chain members impacts the dynamics of probabilistic selling, this paper uses a game-theory-based framework to capture two different power structures in supply chains: a manufacturer-led structure and a retailer-led structure. Our work uncovers several important findings. First, we reveal that power structure plays an important role in shaping the introduction of probabilistic selling. Probabilistic selling is more likely to arise in the manufacturer-led supply chain when product differentiation is relatively small, whereas it is more likely to emerge in the retailer-led supply chain when product differentiation is substantial. Second, we show that the impact of probabilistic selling on the profitability of supply chain members varies with power structure. The dominant member always benefits from the adoption of probabilistic selling, while the subordinate member may experience a loss in profit. Third, we find that inter-party transfers within supply chains can facilitate the adoption of probabilistic selling, creating a “win-win” outcome. The direction of the transfers varies with the power structure. Our work advances the understanding of probabilistic selling under different power structures in supply chains.

不透明产品在广泛的市场中越来越受欢迎，在这些市场中，卖家和供应商可能拥有不对称的市场力量。为了研究供应链成员之间的权力分配如何影响概率销售的动态，本文使用基于博弈论的框架来捕捉供应链中两种不同的权力结构：制造商主导结构和零售商主导结构。我们的工作揭示了几个重要的发现。首先，我们揭示了权力结构在概率销售引入的形成中起着重要作用。当产品差异化相对较小时，在制造商主导的供应链中更容易出现概率销售，而当产品差异化较大时，在零售商主导的供应链中更容易出现概率销售。其次，我们证明了概率销售对供应链成员盈利能力的影响随权力结构的不同而不同。采用概率出售，主导成员总是受益，而从属成员则可能遭受利润损失。第三，我们发现供应链内部的多方转移可以促进概率销售的采用，创造一个“双赢”的结果。这种转移的方向随着权力结构的不同而不同。我们的工作促进了对供应链中不同权力结构下的概率销售的理解。

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引用次数: 0

Is it wise for cross-border e-commerce platforms to bear estimated imported charges on behalf of consumers? 跨境电商平台代消费者承担预估进口费用是否明智？

IF 1 1区工程技术 Q1 ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL

International Journal of Production Economics

Pub Date : 2026-01-24 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2026.109938

Huiling Song , Xinwei Dong , Mingwu Liu , Bo Xiang , Qinxia Chen

Estimated import charges significantly influence consumer behavior toward imported products, creating a strategic dilemma for cross-border e-commerce platforms (e-platforms). Adopting a tax-exclusive strategy (E) helps control costs but risks losing consumers who are sensitive to additional import charges. In contrast, although a tax-inclusive strategy (I) enhances consumers' willingness to purchase, it also increases the import charge burden on e-platforms. To examine this trade-off, we develop a stylized cross-border e-commerce supply chain model consisting of a foreign brand owner and two asymmetric e-platforms, where e-platform A has a higher demand potential than e-platform B. Four strategy profiles arise from the e-platforms’ strategic choices: EE, EI, IE, and II. The results indicate that when an e-platform adopts the tax-inclusive strategy, its retail price rises, with the increase reflecting all or part of the import charges. Moreover, e-platform B with a lower demand potential has a stronger incentive to adopt the tax-inclusive strategy. We also derive sufficient conditions under which the Nash equilibria of the tax-inclusive strategy game correspond to EE, EI, and II, while IE cannot emerge as a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we identify conflict regions where the e-platforms’ Nash equilibria misalign with the brand owner's preferred outcomes. To address the misalignments arising from the coexistence of EE and II equilibria, we propose an equilibrium selection mechanism that incorporates transfer payments and subsidy incentives. This mechanism achieves a “win–win–win” outcome for the brand owner and both e-platforms.

估计的进口费用显著影响消费者对进口产品的行为，使跨境电子商务平台（e-平台）面临战略困境。采用免税策略(E)有助于控制成本，但有可能失去对额外进口费用敏感的消费者。相比之下，虽然减税策略(I)增强了消费者的购买意愿，但也增加了电子平台的进口费用负担。为了检验这种权衡，我们建立了一个由外国品牌所有者和两个不对称电子平台组成的风格化跨境电子商务供应链模型，其中电子平台a比电子平台b具有更高的需求潜力。电子平台的战略选择产生了四种战略概况：EE、EI、IE和II。结果表明，当电子平台采用含税策略时，其零售价格上涨，其上涨反映了全部或部分进口费用。此外，需求潜力较低的电子平台B采取税收包容性策略的动机更强。我们还推导出了包容性税收策略博弈的纳什均衡对应于EE、EI和II的充分条件，而IE不能作为纳什均衡出现。此外，我们确定了电子平台的纳什均衡与品牌所有者偏好结果不一致的冲突区域。为了解决EE和II均衡共存所产生的失调，我们提出了一种包含转移支付和补贴激励的均衡选择机制。这种机制为品牌所有者和两个电子平台实现了“三赢”的结果。

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引用次数: 0

Effect of BOPS implementation for omnichannel retailing with contingent free shipping policy 实施BOPS对有条件免运费全渠道零售的影响

IF 1 1区工程技术 Q1 ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL

International Journal of Production Economics

Pub Date : 2026-01-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2026.109936

Ning Li

This paper studies the effect of buy-online-and-pick-up-in-store (BOPS) implementation for an omnichannel retailer providing online and offline channels, where product price and free-shipping threshold are decision variables. Especially, for the online channel, the retailer employs a contingent free shipping (CFS) policy. Based on the different characteristics of purchasing channels, we first construct the utility functions of purchasing channels and then employ the principle of maximum utility to obtain demand functions. Further, we develop optimization problem models with and without BOPS channels to study the effect of BOPS. Then, based on the original problem, we consider two extension models (i.e., the difficulty of finding suitable add-on product and the market competition). Finally, we conduct some numerical experiments to obtain some managerial insights about the BOPS implementation. Our results show that the BOPS implementation can increase the total demand. However, the BOPS channel is beneficial for omnichannel retailers only under the small BOPS hassle cost and the lower BOPS operation cost. Besides, when the CFS policy has less attractiveness to online customers, the BOPS implementation is more beneficial to omnichannel retailers.

本文研究了以产品价格和免运费阈值为决策变量，同时提供线上和线下渠道的全渠道零售商的在线购买和店内提货（BOPS）实施效果。特别是，对于在线渠道，零售商采用了随机免费送货（CFS）政策。根据采购渠道的不同特点，首先构建了采购渠道的效用函数，然后运用效用最大化原则得到需求函数。进一步，我们建立了有和没有BOPS通道的优化问题模型来研究BOPS的影响。然后，在原问题的基础上，我们考虑了两个扩展模型（即寻找合适的附加产品的难度和市场竞争）。最后，我们进行了一些数值实验，以获得一些关于BOPS实施的管理见解。我们的研究结果表明，实施防喷器可以增加总需求。然而，只有在BOPS纠纷成本小、BOPS运营成本较低的情况下，BOPS渠道才有利于全渠道零售商。此外，当CFS政策对在线客户的吸引力降低时，BOPS的实施对全渠道零售商更有利。

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引用次数: 0

LLM-enabled carbon emissions abatement in green production: Single or double hedging? 法学硕士支持的绿色生产中的碳减排：单一还是双重对冲？

IF 1 1区工程技术 Q1 ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL

International Journal of Production Economics

Pub Date : 2026-01-22 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2026.109933

Jiangyu Tong , Yue Zhai , T.C.E. Cheng

In green supply chains, as consumers become increasingly sensitive to environmental concerns, manufacturers striving for greater carbon reduction find it essential to capture more market share through green production. However, uncertainties in the production process often result in actual carbon emissions abatement (CEA) levels falling short of targets. With the rise of large language models (LLM), which is known for enhancing decision-making and process optimization, there is a growing tendency to use LLM for facilitating CEA. This study examines the effectiveness and impact of LLM-enabled carbon emissions hedging (L-CEH) on green production performance under uncertain production process within a supply chain involving an upstream manufacturer of semi-finished products and a downstream manufacturer of finished products. We formulate four downstream-led Stackelberg models, including upstream single hedging, downstream single hedging, double hedging, and a non-hedging benchmark, to delineate the applicability and performance of each mechanism. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is among the first to theoretically analyze LLM performance in CEA while considering uncertainty control. Our findings indicate that both manufacturers can maximize profits under double hedging. While in single hedging scenarios, L-CEH adoption of the manufacturer who is more vulnerable to production uncertainties allows both enterprises to achieve higher profits. Notably, a manufacturer with a higher failure rate, though required to hedge, can attain significant profits by setting a lower carbon reduction target, provided the other enterprise with a lower failure rate sets a higher target.

在绿色供应链中，随着消费者对环境问题的关注日益敏感，努力减少碳排放的制造商发现，通过绿色生产获得更多的市场份额至关重要。然而，生产过程中的不确定性往往导致实际碳减排（CEA）水平达不到目标。随着以增强决策和流程优化而闻名的大型语言模型（LLM）的兴起，使用LLM促进CEA的趋势越来越大。本研究考察了供应链中上游半成品制造商和下游成品制造商在不确定生产过程下llm碳排放对冲（L-CEH）对绿色生产绩效的有效性和影响。我们建立了上游单一套期保值、下游单一套期保值、双重套期保值和非套期保值基准四种下游主导的Stackelberg模型，以描述每种机制的适用性和性能。据我们所知，本文是第一个在考虑不确定性控制的情况下从理论上分析CEA LLM绩效的论文。我们的研究结果表明，在双重对冲下，两家制造商都可以实现利润最大化。而在单一对冲情景下，采用L-CEH的制造商更容易受到生产不确定性的影响，从而使双方企业获得更高的利润。值得注意的是，故障率较高的制造商虽然需要对冲，但如果故障率较低的另一家企业设定较高的碳减排目标，则可以通过设定较低的碳减排目标获得可观的利润。

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引用次数: 0

Return policy selection and blockchain technology adoption decision in a supply chain with quality information disclosure 具有质量信息披露的供应链退货政策选择与区块链技术采用决策

IF 1 1区工程技术 Q1 ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL

International Journal of Production Economics

Pub Date : 2026-01-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2026.109935

Haijiao Li , Ye Yao , Guoqing Zhang

Distrust in product quality increases customers’ perceived risk and the likelihood of product returns. Lenient return policies and blockchain technology (BCT) are two key strategies for mitigating this distrust. However, the strategies incur high implementation costs. Therefore, making strategy decisions on return policy and BCT adoption is crucial for optimizing supply chain performance. This study develops analytical supply chain models involving a manufacturer and an online retailer, where the manufacturer decides whether to adopt BCT, and the retailer selects between a no-return policy and a money-back guarantee (MBG). Consequently, four cases are explored in this study. We derive the optimal decisions and corresponding profits for each case and find that customer trust in product quality increases the profits when BCT is adopted. Comparing these cases, the results suggest that the no-return policy and the MBG may incentivize the manufacturer to adopt BCT because BCT enhances product quality transparency and strengthens supply chain trust. Furthermore, the combination of BCT adoption and an MBG is optimal strategy when the quality cost coefficient is low and the net return value is positive, as the strategy simultaneously enhances customer trust and reduces the risks and costs associated with returns. Conversely, when the quality cost coefficient is high and the net return value is negative, the optimal strategy shifts to no BCT adoption and a no-return policy. Additionally, several extensions are discussed to check the robustness of the findings.

对产品质量的不信任增加了顾客的感知风险和产品退货的可能性。宽松的退货政策和区块链技术（BCT）是缓解这种不信任的两个关键策略。然而，这些策略的实施成本很高。因此，制定退货政策和BCT采用的战略决策对于优化供应链绩效至关重要。本研究建立了涉及制造商和在线零售商的供应链分析模型，其中制造商决定是否采用BCT，零售商在不退货政策和退款保证（MBG）之间进行选择。因此，本研究探讨了四个案例。我们得到了每种情况下的最优决策和相应的利润，并发现当采用BCT时，客户对产品质量的信任增加了利润。结果表明，无退货政策和MBG可以激励制造商采用BCT，因为BCT提高了产品质量透明度，增强了供应链信任。此外，当质量成本系数较低且净回报值为正值时，采用BCT和MBG的组合是最优策略，因为该策略同时增强了客户信任，降低了与回报相关的风险和成本。相反，当质量成本系数较高且净回报值为负值时，最优策略转向不采用BCT和不退货策略。此外，还讨论了几个扩展，以检查结果的鲁棒性。

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引用次数: 0

The impact of subcontracting on service systems with time-sensitive strategic customers 分包对具有时间敏感型战略客户的服务系统的影响

IF 1 1区工程技术 Q1 ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL

International Journal of Production Economics

Pub Date : 2026-01-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2026.109920

Myron Benioudakis

We consider a service system consisting of a provider who offers a service in a make-to-order fashion to a market of potential customers, and a subcontractor who can be recruited to speed up the service process. The provider operates a Markovian queue at a standard service rate and charges customers a fixed fee upon joining. At each busy cycle, the provider offers a salary to a subcontractor in exchange for increasing the service rate. The subcontractor decides whether to accept the offer while incurring a labor cost per unit of time. Arriving customers, who are strategic and time-sensitive, cannot observe the system’s queue length or the implemented service policy. They have a service value upon completion and incur a waiting cost per unit of time. Based on their utility maximization, they make individual join-or-balk decisions, considering both the behavior of other customers and the subcontractor’s strategic involvement.

We derive the equilibrium demand of customers as a response to the subcontractor’s commitment rate using a two-dimensional continuous-time Markov Chain. We define the collaboration regions based on salary thresholds, highlighting the reservation salaries that ensure collaboration between the two parties. Finally, using a Stackelberg game framework, we show that the subcontractor does not always opt for full commitment. When the provider relies less on subcontractor assistance, the subcontractor strategically prefers partial commitment, balancing the trade-off between idle periods and longer busy periods.

我们考虑一个服务系统，它由一个以订制方式向潜在客户市场提供服务的供应商和一个可以被招募来加快服务过程的分包商组成。提供商以标准费率运行马尔可夫队列，并在客户加入时收取固定费用。在每个繁忙周期，提供商向分包商提供工资，以换取提高服务率。分包商决定是否接受报价，同时产生单位时间的人工成本。到达的客户具有策略性和时间敏感性，他们无法观察到系统的队列长度或实现的服务策略。它们在完成时具有服务价值，并产生单位时间的等待成本。基于他们的效用最大化，他们在考虑其他客户的行为和分包商的战略参与的情况下，做出个人的加入或阻止决策。利用二维连续时间马尔可夫链导出了客户的均衡需求对分包商承诺率的响应。我们根据工资阈值定义协作区域，突出显示保证双方协作的保留工资。最后，使用Stackelberg博弈框架，我们表明分包商并不总是选择完全承诺。当供应商较少依赖分包商的帮助时，分包商在策略上倾向于部分承诺，以平衡空闲期和较长繁忙期之间的权衡。

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引用次数: 0

Effects of multiple incentive policies on carbon information disclosure strategies of power battery: A complex network evolutionary game analysis 多种激励政策对动力电池碳信息披露策略的影响：一个复杂网络进化博弈分析

IF 1 1区工程技术 Q1 ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL

International Journal of Production Economics

Pub Date : 2026-01-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2026.109919

Lu Zhu , Juan He

Power batteries are considered a key of electrification and low-carbon development in the transportation industry. Carbon information disclosure, as an environmental regulatory tool, plays a significant role in promoting carbon reduction efforts among power battery firms. While Chinese provinces and cities have introduced multiple policies to incentivize carbon information disclosure, existing research has paid limited attention to the impact of such incentive policies on power battery carbon information disclosure, particularly the effects of combined policy incentives. Therefore, this paper constructs a three-layer analytical framework integrating complex network topology association, evolutionary game strategy interaction, and policy combination scenario analysis to explore the effects of various subsidy policies (eg., carbon reduction subsidies) and financial policies (eg., disclosure support loans) and their combinations on carbon information disclosure by power battery firms. The study shows that both subsidy policies and financial policies can promote positive disclosure of carbon information for power batteries. However, financial policies alone have limited effects in promoting carbon information disclosure by power battery firms, and moderate subsidy policies are necessary. Policy combinations exhibit synergistic effects under certain conditions. Although pure subsidy-based combinations can effectively promote disclosure, they may increase the fiscal burden. It is advisable to transition gradually from pure subsidy-based combinations to “subsidy + financial” policy combinations. The three-layer analytical framework established in this study provides a reference for policymakers in making actual decisions.

动力电池被认为是交通运输行业电气化和低碳发展的关键。碳信息披露作为一种环境监管工具，对推动动力电池企业碳减排具有重要作用。虽然中国各省市出台了多种碳信息披露激励政策，但现有研究对这些激励政策对动力电池碳信息披露的影响，特别是政策激励组合的效果关注有限。为此，本文构建了一个集复杂网络拓扑关联、演化博弈策略交互、政策组合场景分析为一体的三层分析框架，探讨了不同补贴政策(如：（如碳减排补贴）和财政政策(如：（披露支持贷款）及其组合对动力电池企业碳信息披露的影响。研究表明，补贴政策和金融政策都能促进动力电池碳信息的积极披露。但单靠财政政策对动力电池企业碳信息披露的促进作用有限，需要适度的补贴政策。政策组合在一定条件下表现出协同效应。单纯以补贴为基础的合并虽然能有效促进披露，但也可能增加财政负担。建议从单纯的补贴型组合逐步过渡到“补贴+财政”的政策组合。本研究建立的三层分析框架为决策者在实际决策中提供了参考。

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引用次数: 0

Human vs. Generative AI: Strategic content creation mode choices for competing creators 人类vs.生成AI：竞争创造者的战略性内容创造模式选择

IF 1 1区工程技术 Q1 ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL

International Journal of Production Economics

Pub Date : 2026-01-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2026.109913

Nenggui Zhao , Youqing Wu , Kai Li

With the rapid development of the platform economy, product-related content (e.g., short videos, copywriting, and live streaming) has emerged as a pivotal determinant of consumer decision-making. The widespread adoption of Generative Artificial Intelligence (GAI) technology enables content creators to produce product-related content more efficiently and at lower cost, yet it concurrently introduces new challenges. Specifically, the proliferation of GAI has heightened consumer skepticism regarding the authenticity and reliability of GAI-created content. Therefore, achieving a balance between GAI application and consumer trust is crucial for content creators. This paper examines a retail platform with two competing content creators who face a strategic choice between two content creation strategies: GAI-creation and human-creation, with consumers exhibiting greater trust in the latter. Our findings indicate that when the costs of GAI-creation are low, creators increase their content effort levels and set higher selling prices. Conversely, higher GAI costs result in reduced effort levels and lower pricing. Notably, under low GAI-creation costs, adopting GAI proves beneficial for creators, irrespective of their competitors’ strategies. Furthermore, if both parties adopt the GAI-creation strategy, a triple-win situation can be achieved among the platform and the two creators. However, when the GAI-creation costs are high, creators eschew GAI adoption regardless of their competitors’ decisions. In such cases, mutual reliance on human-creation yields a triple-win outcome for the entire supply chain. Finally, under hybrid strategy scenarios, the platform systematically guides creators with greater market influence toward the content creation strategy that holds relative advantages.

随着平台经济的快速发展，与产品相关的内容（如短视频、文案、直播等）已经成为影响消费者决策的关键因素。生成式人工智能（GAI）技术的广泛采用使内容创作者能够以更低的成本更高效地生产与产品相关的内容，但同时也带来了新的挑战。具体来说，GAI的扩散加剧了消费者对GAI创建内容的真实性和可靠性的怀疑。因此，实现GAI应用和消费者信任之间的平衡对于内容创造者来说是至关重要的。本文研究了一个零售平台，该平台有两个相互竞争的内容创造者，他们面临着两种内容创造策略的战略选择：人工智能创造和人类创造，消费者对后者表现出更大的信任。我们的研究结果表明，当人工智能创造的成本较低时，创作者会增加他们的内容努力水平，并设定更高的销售价格。相反，较高的GAI成本会导致工作水平的降低和价格的降低。值得注意的是，在低人工智能创造成本的情况下，采用人工智能证明对创造者是有益的，而不管其竞争对手的策略如何。此外，如果双方都采用ai创作策略，则可以实现平台与两家创作者的三赢局面。然而，当人工智能的创造成本很高时，创造者就会不顾竞争对手的决定而回避采用人工智能。在这种情况下，对人类创造的相互依赖为整个供应链带来了三赢的结果。最后，在混合策略场景下，平台系统地引导具有较大市场影响力的创作者走向具有相对优势的内容创作策略。

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引用次数: 0

Who should lead the decarbonization transition? Leadership and shared responsibility in decarbonization supply chains 谁应该领导脱碳转型？在脱碳供应链中发挥领导作用并分担责任

IF 1 1区工程技术 Q1 ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL

International Journal of Production Economics

Pub Date : 2026-01-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2026.109911

Qingyu Liu , Bin Shen , Ciwei Dong , Dong Yang

Growing concerns over global climate change, net-zero targets and the urgency to fulfill Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have intensified the need for effective decarbonization strategies. Collaborative efforts among manufacturers and retailers can accelerate the transition from high-carbon products (HCPs) to decarbonization products (DCPs). This paper analyzes a two-period supply chain with two leadership strategies for guiding the decarbonization level: the manufacturer-led decarbonization (M-DCPs) strategy and the retailer-led decarbonization (R-DCPs) strategy. Supported by a shared responsibility mechanism, these strategies influence both the supply chain's long-term profitability and its overall emission reductions. Our findings show that when either firm adopts a long-term perspective and assumes the leadership role in the decarbonization level, the leader can enhance its own profitability. In contrast, focusing on a short-term perspective may cause firms to bypass the decarbonization transition, suggesting that such a transition does not necessarily offer immediate profitability. Moreover, we find that although DCPs may exhibit a lower second-period price and demand after the decarbonization transition relative to the pre-transition period, from a profitability perspective, the M-DCPs strategy yields higher overall profitability for the supply chain; while from an environmental perspective, the R-DCPs strategy achieves more emission reductions. Notably, only the M-DCPs strategy achieves a Pareto improvement while this outcome cannot achieve under the R-DCPs strategy. Our findings emphasize the need for a forward-looking commitment to decarbonization, supported by an effective shared responsibility mechanism, to advance environmental goals, enhance supply chain profitability and guide industry professionals in fostering collective decarbonization transitions in multi-period contexts.

对全球气候变化、净零排放目标以及实现可持续发展目标的紧迫性的日益关注，加剧了对有效脱碳战略的需求。制造商和零售商之间的合作可以加速从高碳产品（HCPs）向脱碳产品（dcp）的过渡。本文分析了两期供应链的两种领导策略：制造商主导的脱碳（m - dcp）战略和零售商主导的脱碳（r- dcp）战略。在共同责任机制的支持下，这些战略既影响供应链的长期盈利能力，也影响供应链的总体减排。我们的研究结果表明，当任何一家企业采用长期视角并在脱碳层面担任领导角色时，领导者都可以提高自身的盈利能力。相比之下，关注短期前景可能会导致企业绕过脱碳转型，这表明这种转型不一定能立即带来盈利。此外，我们发现，尽管dcp在脱碳转型后的第二阶段价格和需求可能低于转型前，但从盈利能力的角度来看，m - dcp战略为供应链带来了更高的整体盈利能力；而从环境角度来看，r - dcp战略实现了更多的减排。值得注意的是，只有m - dcp策略实现了帕累托改进，而r - dcp策略无法实现这一结果。我们的研究结果强调，需要在有效的共同责任机制的支持下，对脱碳做出前瞻性承诺，以推进环境目标，提高供应链盈利能力，并指导行业专业人士在多时期背景下促进集体脱碳转型。

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引用次数: 0