{"title":"转售的两部分关税垄断者","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111909","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I model resale in the context of a two-part tariff monopolist identifying two groups: low and high demand consumers. There is a group of potential intermediaries that resell the good to low demand consumers. I show that under certain circumstances resale can benefit the monopolist.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.1000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A two-part tariff monopolist with resale\",\"authors\":\"\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111909\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>I model resale in the context of a two-part tariff monopolist identifying two groups: low and high demand consumers. There is a group of potential intermediaries that resell the good to low demand consumers. I show that under certain circumstances resale can benefit the monopolist.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":11468,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Economics Letters\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-08-16\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Economics Letters\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176524003938\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economics Letters","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176524003938","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
I model resale in the context of a two-part tariff monopolist identifying two groups: low and high demand consumers. There is a group of potential intermediaries that resell the good to low demand consumers. I show that under certain circumstances resale can benefit the monopolist.
期刊介绍：
Many economists today are concerned by the proliferation of journals and the concomitant labyrinth of research to be conquered in order to reach the specific information they require. To combat this tendency, Economics Letters has been conceived and designed outside the realm of the traditional economics journal. As a Letters Journal, it consists of concise communications (letters) that provide a means of rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in all fields of economic research.
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