透明度、机构和投资:采掘业透明度倡议(EITI)案例

IF 10.2 2区 经济学 0 ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES Resources Policy Pub Date : 2024-08-26 DOI:10.1016/j.resourpol.2024.105248
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引用次数: 0

摘要

自《采掘业透明度倡议》(EITI)成立以来,许多资源丰富的国家加入了国际透明度倡议。考虑到资源丰富的国家历来偏好不透明,这一趋势令人惊讶。一旦一个国家加入《采掘业透明度行动倡议》,该国就会报告其与自然资源相关的收入、合同和许可证。公开资源收入信息可能会威胁到透明度较低的民主和专制政权领导层的生存。面对提高透明度所带来的威胁,这些国家仍然保持其 "采掘业透明度行动倡议 "成员身份,但原因何在?本研究利用最新发布的数据,认为各国参与国际透明度倡议是为了向国际投资者发出一个有利经济环境的信号。本研究表明,在自我报告机制下,投资者会根据一个国家加入 "采掘业透明度行动倡议 "的程度对其进行奖励或惩罚。为了解决选择偏差和内生性问题,本研究使用两阶段最小二乘回归和工具变量估计法对 128 个国家进行了实证分析(2002-2015 年),结果发现,与透明度较高的国家相比,透明度较低的国家加入 "采掘业透明度行动倡议 "对外国直接投资(FDI)流入的积极影响更大。
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Transparency, institutions, and investment: The case of the extractive industries transparency initiative (EITI)

Since the establishment of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), many resource-rich countries have joined international transparency initiatives. Considering that resource-rich countries have historically preferred opacity, this trend is surprising. Once a country joins the EITI, the country reports on its revenues, contracts, and licenses related to natural resources. The disclosure of information on resource revenues could threaten the survival of the leadership in less transparent democratic and autocratic regimes. In the face of the threats posed by enhanced transparency, these countries maintain their EITI membership, but for what reason? Using newly released data, this study argues that countries participate in international transparency initiatives to signal a favorable economic environment to international investors. This study demonstrates that under the self-reporting mechanism, investors reward or punish a country according to the level of its EITI membership. Based on an empirical analysis of 128 countries using two-stage least squares regression and the instrumental variable estimation in order to deal with selection bias and endogeneity (2002–2015), this study finds that joining in the EITI has a stronger positive effect on the inflow of foreign direct in-vestment (FDI) in less transparent countries, than in more transparent ones.

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来源期刊
Resources Policy
Resources Policy ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES-
CiteScore
13.40
自引率
23.50%
发文量
602
审稿时长
69 days
期刊介绍: Resources Policy is an international journal focused on the economics and policy aspects of mineral and fossil fuel extraction, production, and utilization. It targets individuals in academia, government, and industry. The journal seeks original research submissions analyzing public policy, economics, social science, geography, and finance in the fields of mining, non-fuel minerals, energy minerals, fossil fuels, and metals. Mineral economics topics covered include mineral market analysis, price analysis, project evaluation, mining and sustainable development, mineral resource rents, resource curse, mineral wealth and corruption, mineral taxation and regulation, strategic minerals and their supply, and the impact of mineral development on local communities and indigenous populations. The journal specifically excludes papers with agriculture, forestry, or fisheries as their primary focus.
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