股票回购的时机：人脉广的首席执行官是利还是弊？

IF 3.6 2区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Banking & Finance Pub Date : 2024-08-12 DOI:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2024.107288

Amedeo De Cesari , Nicoletta Marinelli , Rohit Sonika

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引用次数: 0

摘要

通过对每日回购交易的抽样调查，我们发现拥有广泛职业网络的首席执行官的回购价格要高于人脉较少的同行。这一发现通过了大量的稳健性测试，不太可能是内生性偏差的结果。机构投资者、大股东和独立董事的监督以及董事会的低繁忙程度减轻了人脉广泛的首席执行官对回购时机的不利影响。此外，人脉更广的首席执行官与回购交易前后的内部人净销售额关联度更高。总体而言，我们的证据与首席执行官-股东代理冲突的解释和首席执行官的权力机制是一致的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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The timing of stock repurchases: Do well-connected CEOs help or harm?

Using a sample of daily repurchase transactions, we find that CEOs with extensive professional networks execute buybacks at higher prices relative to their less-connected peers. This finding survives a large battery of robustness tests and is unlikely to be the product of endogeneity biases. Monitoring by institutional investors, blockholders, and independent directors, as well as low levels of board busyness mitigate the detrimental effect of a well-connected CEO on repurchase timing. Moreover, better-connected CEOs are more associated with insider net sales around repurchase transactions. Overall, our evidence is consistent with CEO-shareholder agency conflict explanations and CEO power mechanisms.

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来源期刊

Journal of Banking & Finance Multiple-

CiteScore

6.40

自引率

5.40%

发文量

262

期刊介绍： The Journal of Banking and Finance (JBF) publishes theoretical and empirical research papers spanning all the major research fields in finance and banking. The aim of the Journal of Banking and Finance is to provide an outlet for the increasing flow of scholarly research concerning financial institutions and the money and capital markets within which they function. The Journal''s emphasis is on theoretical developments and their implementation, empirical, applied, and policy-oriented research in banking and other domestic and international financial institutions and markets. The Journal''s purpose is to improve communications between, and within, the academic and other research communities and policymakers and operational decision makers at financial institutions - private and public, national and international, and their regulators. The Journal is one of the largest Finance journals, with approximately 1500 new submissions per year, mainly in the following areas: Asset Management; Asset Pricing; Banking (Efficiency, Regulation, Risk Management, Solvency); Behavioural Finance; Capital Structure; Corporate Finance; Corporate Governance; Derivative Pricing and Hedging; Distribution Forecasting with Financial Applications; Entrepreneurial Finance; Empirical Finance; Financial Economics; Financial Markets (Alternative, Bonds, Currency, Commodity, Derivatives, Equity, Energy, Real Estate); FinTech; Fund Management; General Equilibrium Models; High-Frequency Trading; Intermediation; International Finance; Hedge Funds; Investments; Liquidity; Market Efficiency; Market Microstructure; Mergers and Acquisitions; Networks; Performance Analysis; Political Risk; Portfolio Optimization; Regulation of Financial Markets and Institutions; Risk Management and Analysis; Systemic Risk; Term Structure Models; Venture Capital.

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