价值理论中被遗忘的区别

IF 1.1 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-09-02 DOI:10.1007/s11098-024-02209-4
Facundo Rodriguez
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引用次数: 0

摘要

迄今为止,关于最终价值的争论一直被理解为关于最终价值依赖于何种属性的争论。我认为,这场辩论仅仅依赖于依赖性,这使得条件论者很难对内在本质论提出一个连贯的积极的替代方案。关于依赖性的讨论过于粗略,未能区分价值在形而上学上依赖于价值承担者的其他属性的不同方式。为了弥补这一缺陷,我建议我们重新 "遗忘 "价值依赖于其他属性的两种方式之间的区别。我们应该把价值赖以存在的属性--价值的基础--与价值赖以存在的条件--区分开来。有了这一区分,我对最终价值的两个主要条件主义论述进行了清晰的重新阐述:非工具主义和非衍生主义。如果不理解为对最终价值所依赖的属性提出主张,而是理解为对作为最终价值基础的属性提出更具体的主张,那么这些论述是完全一致的。
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A forgotten distinction in value theory

The debate on final value has been so far understood as a debate over what sort of properties final value depends on. The debate’s reliance on mere dependence has, I argue, made it very difficult for conditionalists to put forward a coherent positive alternative to intrinsicalism. Talk of dependence is too coarse-grained and fails to distinguish between different ways in which value can metaphysically depend on other properties of the value bearer. To remedy this, I propose that we bring back a ‘forgotten’ distinction between two ways in which value can depend on other properties. We should distinguish those properties in virtue of which a value is had—the grounds of the value—from those on condition of which it is had—which following Dancy I call the enablers of the value. With this distinction in hand, I offer a clear re-statement of the two main conditionalist accounts of final value: non-instrumentalism and non-derivatism. When understood not as making claims about the properties on which final value depends but rather as making more specific ones about the properties that ground final value, these accounts are perfectly coherent.

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来源期刊
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
7.70%
发文量
127
期刊介绍: Philosophical Studies was founded in 1950 by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars to provide a periodical dedicated to work in analytic philosophy. The journal remains devoted to the publication of papers in exclusively analytic philosophy. Papers applying formal techniques to philosophical problems are welcome. The principal aim is to publish articles that are models of clarity and precision in dealing with significant philosophical issues. It is intended that readers of the journal will be kept abreast of the central issues and problems of contemporary analytic philosophy. Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.
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