为什么道德生物强化不能可靠地产生美德?

IF 1.3 3区 哲学 Q3 ETHICS Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-11-22 DOI:10.1093/jmp/jhae035
Gina Lebkuecher, Marley Hornewer, Maya V Roytman, Sydney Samoska, Joseph M Vukov
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引用次数: 0

摘要

道德生物强化提出了增强道德理想情感和倾向的可能性。虽然有些学者提出道德生物强化可以产生美德,但我们认为,在美德伦理学框架内,道德生物强化不能可靠地产生美德。此外,在美德伦理学框架内,追求道德生物强化会带来道德风险。为了提出这一论点,我们考虑了美德的三个方面--动机、理性和行为。我们认为,一个人要想成为美德之人,必须(i)乐于做正确的事,并具有正确的动机态度;(ii)正确推理特定道德困境的要求;(iii)有意识地、持续地实践和培养美德。这些道德层面--简而言之:正是美德伦理框架所强调的那些层面--无法通过现有的道德生物强化技术得到一致或可靠的满足。
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Why Moral Bioenhancement Cannot Reliably Produce Virtue.

Moral bioenhancement presents the possibility of enhancing morally desirable emotions and dispositions. While some scholars have proposed that moral bioenhancement can produce virtue, we argue that within a virtue ethics framework moral bioenhancement cannot reliably produce virtue. Moreover, on a virtue ethics framework, the pursuit of moral bioenhancement carries moral risks. To make this argument, we consider three aspects of virtue-its motivational, rational, and behavioral components. In order to be virtuous, we argue, a person must (i) take pleasure in doing the right thing and have the correct motivational attitudes; (ii) reason correctly about what is called for in a particular ethical dilemma; and (iii) intentionally and continuously practice and cultivate virtues. These dimensions of morality-in short: precisely those emphasized in a virtue ethics framework-cannot be consistently or reliably met using existing moral bioenhancement technology.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.90
自引率
6.20%
发文量
30
期刊介绍: This bimonthly publication explores the shared themes and concerns of philosophy and the medical sciences. Central issues in medical research and practice have important philosophical dimensions, for, in treating disease and promoting health, medicine involves presuppositions about human goals and values. Conversely, the concerns of philosophy often significantly relate to those of medicine, as philosophers seek to understand the nature of medical knowledge and the human condition in the modern world. In addition, recent developments in medical technology and treatment create moral problems that raise important philosophical questions. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy aims to provide an ongoing forum for the discussion of such themes and issues.
期刊最新文献
Disability, Offense, and the Expressivist Objection to Medical Aid in Dying. Kidney Sales and Disrespectful Demands: A Reply to Rippon. Plastic Resilience: Rethinking Resilience in Illness with Catherine Malabou. A Defense of the Obligation to Keep Promises to the Dead. Why Moral Bioenhancement Cannot Reliably Produce Virtue.
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