Private ownership in monopolistic competition models

Motivated by empirical evidence, I study the properties of a monopolistic competition model with private ownership. Toward that goal, I consider a monopolistic competition model with additive preferences, homogeneous workers and homogeneous firms. I then introduce in such a standard framework a single additional ingredient: private ownership. Private ownership means that each firm is owned and managed by a single household called the entrepreneur, and this entrepreneur receives profits as sole revenues. In turn, private ownership changes the nature of entry. Free entry in the industry is no longer satisfied. Rather, the number of firms is now determined through occupational choice. Armed with this new framework, I provide a full characterization of a market equilibrium, and compare it to the standard model with collective ownership and free entry. Notably, I find new results concerning optimality, the transmission of aggregate shocks and the ability of the new model to replicate well-established empirical facts.