高管教育背景和企业战略信息披露

IF 4.8 2区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE International Review of Economics & Finance Pub Date : 2024-08-30 DOI:10.1016/j.iref.2024.103564
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究分析了高管教育背景与企业战略信息披露之间的联系,实证结果表明,在高管教育水平较高的企业中,高管教育水平越高,企业信息披露频率越高,报告的正面和负面公告数量越多。在高管教育水平较低的企业中,高管教育水平越高,企业信息披露频率越低,报告的正面公告越多,负面公告越少。
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Executive educational background and corporate strategic information disclosure

This study analyzes the link between executives' educational background and corporate strategic information disclosure, and the empirical results show that in firms with higher levels of executive education, the higher the executives' educational level, the higher frequency of corporate disclosure, and the higher number of positive and negative announcements reported. In firms with lower levels of executive education, the higher education level of executives, the lower frequency of corporate disclosure, the more favourable announcements will be reported and the fewer negative announcements will be reported.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.30
自引率
2.20%
发文量
253
期刊介绍: The International Review of Economics & Finance (IREF) is a scholarly journal devoted to the publication of high quality theoretical and empirical articles in all areas of international economics, macroeconomics and financial economics. Contributions that facilitate the communications between the real and the financial sectors of the economy are of particular interest.
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