没有基本事实的信念激发机制

Niklas Valentin Lehmann
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引用次数: 0

摘要

这篇综述文章探讨了在无法根据客观真相验证信息的情况下,如何从多个个体那里获取真实信息的难题,这个问题被称为 "无验证信息获取"(IEWV)。本文回顾了超过 25 种旨在激励人们在这种情况下讲真话的机制,以及它们在实证研究中的有效性。分析发现,尽管许多机制在理论上确保了贝叶斯纳什均衡的真实性,但此类机制在实践中发挥作用的经验证据非常有限,而且普遍薄弱。鉴于许多机制非常复杂,不容易传达给研究对象,本综述认为,更简单、更直观的机制可能更容易测试和应用。
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Mechanisms for belief elicitation without ground truth
This review article examines the challenge of eliciting truthful information from multiple individuals when such information cannot be verified against an objective truth, a problem known as information elicitation without verification (IEWV). This article reviews over 25 mechanisms designed to incentivize truth-telling in such scenarios, and their effectiveness in empirical studies. The analysis finds that although many mechanisms theoretically ensure truthfulness as a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, empirical evidence of such mechanisms working in practice is very limited and generally weak. Consequently, more empirical research is needed to validate mechanisms. Given that many mechanisms are very complex and cannot be easily conveyed to research subjects, this review suggests that simpler, more intuitive mechanisms may be easier to test and apply.
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