{"title":"最佳实物再分配","authors":"Zi Yang Kang, Mitchell Watt","doi":"arxiv-2409.06112","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops a model of in-kind redistribution where consumers\nparticipate in either a private market or a government-designed program, but\nnot both. We characterize when a social planner, seeking to maximize weighted\ntotal surplus, can strictly improve upon the laissez-faire outcome. We show\nthat the optimal mechanism consists of three components: a public option,\nnonlinear subsidies, and laissez-faire consumption. We quantify the resulting\ndistortions and relate them to the correlation between consumer demand and\nwelfare weights. Our findings reveal that while private market access\nconstrains the social planner's ability to redistribute, it also strengthens\nthe rationale for non-market allocations.","PeriodicalId":501273,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - General Economics","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Optimal In-Kind Redistribution\",\"authors\":\"Zi Yang Kang, Mitchell Watt\",\"doi\":\"arxiv-2409.06112\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper develops a model of in-kind redistribution where consumers\\nparticipate in either a private market or a government-designed program, but\\nnot both. We characterize when a social planner, seeking to maximize weighted\\ntotal surplus, can strictly improve upon the laissez-faire outcome. We show\\nthat the optimal mechanism consists of three components: a public option,\\nnonlinear subsidies, and laissez-faire consumption. We quantify the resulting\\ndistortions and relate them to the correlation between consumer demand and\\nwelfare weights. Our findings reveal that while private market access\\nconstrains the social planner's ability to redistribute, it also strengthens\\nthe rationale for non-market allocations.\",\"PeriodicalId\":501273,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"arXiv - ECON - General Economics\",\"volume\":\"9 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"arXiv - ECON - General Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.06112\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - ECON - General Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.06112","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper develops a model of in-kind redistribution where consumers
participate in either a private market or a government-designed program, but
not both. We characterize when a social planner, seeking to maximize weighted
total surplus, can strictly improve upon the laissez-faire outcome. We show
that the optimal mechanism consists of three components: a public option,
nonlinear subsidies, and laissez-faire consumption. We quantify the resulting
distortions and relate them to the correlation between consumer demand and
welfare weights. Our findings reveal that while private market access
constrains the social planner's ability to redistribute, it also strengthens
the rationale for non-market allocations.