{"title":"竞争性和非竞争性奖励下的证据收集","authors":"Philip Brookins, Jennifer Brown, Dmitry Ryvkin","doi":"arxiv-2409.06248","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Reward schemes may affect not only agents' effort, but also their incentives\nto gather information to reduce the riskiness of the productive activity. In a\nlaboratory experiment using a novel task, we find that the relationship between\nincentives and evidence gathering depends critically on the availability of\ninformation about peers' strategies and outcomes. When no peer information is\navailable, competitive rewards can be associated with more evidence gathering\nthan noncompetitive rewards. In contrast, when decision-makers know what or how\ntheir peers are doing, competitive rewards schemes are associated with less\nactive evidence gathering than noncompetitive schemes. The nature of the\nfeedback -- whether subjects receive information about peers' strategies,\noutcomes, or both -- also affects subjects' incentives to engage in evidence\ngathering. Specifically, only combined feedback about peers' strategies and\nperformance -- from which subjects may assess the overall relationship between\nevidence gathering, riskiness, and success -- is associated with less evidence\ngathering when rewards are based on relative performance; we find no similar\neffect for noncompetitive rewards.","PeriodicalId":501273,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - ECON - General Economics","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Evidence gathering under competitive and noncompetitive rewards\",\"authors\":\"Philip Brookins, Jennifer Brown, Dmitry Ryvkin\",\"doi\":\"arxiv-2409.06248\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Reward schemes may affect not only agents' effort, but also their incentives\\nto gather information to reduce the riskiness of the productive activity. In a\\nlaboratory experiment using a novel task, we find that the relationship between\\nincentives and evidence gathering depends critically on the availability of\\ninformation about peers' strategies and outcomes. When no peer information is\\navailable, competitive rewards can be associated with more evidence gathering\\nthan noncompetitive rewards. In contrast, when decision-makers know what or how\\ntheir peers are doing, competitive rewards schemes are associated with less\\nactive evidence gathering than noncompetitive schemes. The nature of the\\nfeedback -- whether subjects receive information about peers' strategies,\\noutcomes, or both -- also affects subjects' incentives to engage in evidence\\ngathering. Specifically, only combined feedback about peers' strategies and\\nperformance -- from which subjects may assess the overall relationship between\\nevidence gathering, riskiness, and success -- is associated with less evidence\\ngathering when rewards are based on relative performance; we find no similar\\neffect for noncompetitive rewards.\",\"PeriodicalId\":501273,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"arXiv - ECON - General Economics\",\"volume\":\"33 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"arXiv - ECON - General Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.06248\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - ECON - General Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.06248","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Evidence gathering under competitive and noncompetitive rewards
Reward schemes may affect not only agents' effort, but also their incentives
to gather information to reduce the riskiness of the productive activity. In a
laboratory experiment using a novel task, we find that the relationship between
incentives and evidence gathering depends critically on the availability of
information about peers' strategies and outcomes. When no peer information is
available, competitive rewards can be associated with more evidence gathering
than noncompetitive rewards. In contrast, when decision-makers know what or how
their peers are doing, competitive rewards schemes are associated with less
active evidence gathering than noncompetitive schemes. The nature of the
feedback -- whether subjects receive information about peers' strategies,
outcomes, or both -- also affects subjects' incentives to engage in evidence
gathering. Specifically, only combined feedback about peers' strategies and
performance -- from which subjects may assess the overall relationship between
evidence gathering, riskiness, and success -- is associated with less evidence
gathering when rewards are based on relative performance; we find no similar
effect for noncompetitive rewards.