正则表达式博弈的广义 $λ$ 核心概念

arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2024-08-12 DOI:arxiv-2408.06086

Subhadip Chakrabarti, Robert P Gilles, Lina Mallozzi

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摘要

在这篇论文中，我们为正态非合作博弈提出了一种广义的$\lambda$-Core解。我们证明，对于一类可分离博弈来说，这种广义的$\lambda$-Core是非空的，因为这类博弈允许有一个最优纳什均衡。我们提供的例子表明，对于大量的正常形式博弈，广义$λ-Core的非空性是不可预期的。

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A Generalised $λ$-Core Concept for Normal Form Games

In this note we develop a generalisation of the $\lambda$-Core solution for non-cooperative games in normal form. We show that this generalised $\lambda$-Core is non-empty for the class of separable games that admit a socially optimal Nash equilibrium. Examples are provided that indicate that non-emptiness of the generalised $\lambda$-Core cannot be expected for large classes of normal form games.

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arXiv - ECON - Theoretical Economics

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