{"title":"在线广告市场的联合拍卖","authors":"Zhen Zhang, Weian Li, Yahui Lei, Bingzhe Wang, Zhicheng Zhang, Qi Qi, Qiang Liu, Xingxing Wang","doi":"arxiv-2408.09885","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Online advertising is a primary source of income for e-commerce platforms. In\nthe current advertising pattern, the oriented targets are the online store\nowners who are willing to pay extra fees to enhance the position of their\nstores. On the other hand, brand suppliers are also desirable to advertise\ntheir products in stores to boost brand sales. However, the currently used\nadvertising mode cannot satisfy the demand of both stores and brand suppliers\nsimultaneously. To address this, we innovatively propose a joint advertising\nmodel termed Joint Auction, allowing brand suppliers and stores to\ncollaboratively bid for advertising slots, catering to both their needs.\nHowever, conventional advertising auction mechanisms are not suitable for this\nnovel scenario. In this paper, we propose JRegNet, a neural network\narchitecture for the optimal joint auction design, to generate mechanisms that\ncan achieve the optimal revenue and guarantee near dominant strategy incentive\ncompatibility and individual rationality. Finally, multiple experiments are\nconducted on synthetic and real data to demonstrate that our proposed joint\nauction significantly improves platform revenue compared to the known\nbaselines.","PeriodicalId":501316,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Joint Auction in the Online Advertising Market\",\"authors\":\"Zhen Zhang, Weian Li, Yahui Lei, Bingzhe Wang, Zhicheng Zhang, Qi Qi, Qiang Liu, Xingxing Wang\",\"doi\":\"arxiv-2408.09885\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Online advertising is a primary source of income for e-commerce platforms. In\\nthe current advertising pattern, the oriented targets are the online store\\nowners who are willing to pay extra fees to enhance the position of their\\nstores. On the other hand, brand suppliers are also desirable to advertise\\ntheir products in stores to boost brand sales. However, the currently used\\nadvertising mode cannot satisfy the demand of both stores and brand suppliers\\nsimultaneously. To address this, we innovatively propose a joint advertising\\nmodel termed Joint Auction, allowing brand suppliers and stores to\\ncollaboratively bid for advertising slots, catering to both their needs.\\nHowever, conventional advertising auction mechanisms are not suitable for this\\nnovel scenario. In this paper, we propose JRegNet, a neural network\\narchitecture for the optimal joint auction design, to generate mechanisms that\\ncan achieve the optimal revenue and guarantee near dominant strategy incentive\\ncompatibility and individual rationality. Finally, multiple experiments are\\nconducted on synthetic and real data to demonstrate that our proposed joint\\nauction significantly improves platform revenue compared to the known\\nbaselines.\",\"PeriodicalId\":501316,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory\",\"volume\":\"27 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-08-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.09885\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.09885","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Online advertising is a primary source of income for e-commerce platforms. In
the current advertising pattern, the oriented targets are the online store
owners who are willing to pay extra fees to enhance the position of their
stores. On the other hand, brand suppliers are also desirable to advertise
their products in stores to boost brand sales. However, the currently used
advertising mode cannot satisfy the demand of both stores and brand suppliers
simultaneously. To address this, we innovatively propose a joint advertising
model termed Joint Auction, allowing brand suppliers and stores to
collaboratively bid for advertising slots, catering to both their needs.
However, conventional advertising auction mechanisms are not suitable for this
novel scenario. In this paper, we propose JRegNet, a neural network
architecture for the optimal joint auction design, to generate mechanisms that
can achieve the optimal revenue and guarantee near dominant strategy incentive
compatibility and individual rationality. Finally, multiple experiments are
conducted on synthetic and real data to demonstrate that our proposed joint
auction significantly improves platform revenue compared to the known
baselines.