在线广告市场的联合拍卖

Zhen Zhang, Weian Li, Yahui Lei, Bingzhe Wang, Zhicheng Zhang, Qi Qi, Qiang Liu, Xingxing Wang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在线广告是电子商务平台的主要收入来源。在当前的广告模式中,网店店主是主要目标,他们愿意支付额外费用来提升店铺的地位。另一方面,品牌供应商也希望在店铺中为其产品做广告,以促进品牌销售。然而,目前使用的广告模式无法同时满足商店和品牌供应商的需求。针对这一问题,我们创新性地提出了一种联合广告模式--联合竞拍,允许品牌供应商和商店合作竞拍广告时段,满足双方的需求。在本文中,我们提出了用于优化联合拍卖设计的神经网络架构 JRegNet,以生成能够实现最优收益并保证近似主导策略激励相容性和个体理性的机制。最后,我们在合成数据和真实数据上进行了多次实验,证明与已知基准相比,我们提出的联合拍卖能显著提高平台收益。
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Joint Auction in the Online Advertising Market
Online advertising is a primary source of income for e-commerce platforms. In the current advertising pattern, the oriented targets are the online store owners who are willing to pay extra fees to enhance the position of their stores. On the other hand, brand suppliers are also desirable to advertise their products in stores to boost brand sales. However, the currently used advertising mode cannot satisfy the demand of both stores and brand suppliers simultaneously. To address this, we innovatively propose a joint advertising model termed Joint Auction, allowing brand suppliers and stores to collaboratively bid for advertising slots, catering to both their needs. However, conventional advertising auction mechanisms are not suitable for this novel scenario. In this paper, we propose JRegNet, a neural network architecture for the optimal joint auction design, to generate mechanisms that can achieve the optimal revenue and guarantee near dominant strategy incentive compatibility and individual rationality. Finally, multiple experiments are conducted on synthetic and real data to demonstrate that our proposed joint auction significantly improves platform revenue compared to the known baselines.
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