Gagan Aggarwal, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Santiago R. Balseiro, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Yuan Deng, Zhe Feng, Gagan Goel, Christopher Liaw, Haihao Lu, Mohammad Mahdian, Jieming Mao, Aranyak Mehta, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Andres Perlroth, Georgios Piliouras, Jon Schneider, Ariel Schvartzman, Balasubramanian Sivan, Kelly Spendlove, Yifeng Teng, Di Wang, Hanrui Zhang, Mingfei Zhao, Wennan Zhu, Song Zuo
{"title":"在线广告中的自动竞价和拍卖:一项调查","authors":"Gagan Aggarwal, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Santiago R. Balseiro, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Yuan Deng, Zhe Feng, Gagan Goel, Christopher Liaw, Haihao Lu, Mohammad Mahdian, Jieming Mao, Aranyak Mehta, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Andres Perlroth, Georgios Piliouras, Jon Schneider, Ariel Schvartzman, Balasubramanian Sivan, Kelly Spendlove, Yifeng Teng, Di Wang, Hanrui Zhang, Mingfei Zhao, Wennan Zhu, Song Zuo","doi":"arxiv-2408.07685","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this survey, we summarize recent developments in research fueled by the\ngrowing adoption of automated bidding strategies in online advertising. We\nexplore the challenges and opportunities that have arisen as markets embrace\nthis autobidding and cover a range of topics in this area, including bidding\nalgorithms, equilibrium analysis and efficiency of common auction formats, and\noptimal auction design.","PeriodicalId":501316,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory","volume":"164 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Auto-bidding and Auctions in Online Advertising: A Survey\",\"authors\":\"Gagan Aggarwal, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Santiago R. Balseiro, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Yuan Deng, Zhe Feng, Gagan Goel, Christopher Liaw, Haihao Lu, Mohammad Mahdian, Jieming Mao, Aranyak Mehta, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Andres Perlroth, Georgios Piliouras, Jon Schneider, Ariel Schvartzman, Balasubramanian Sivan, Kelly Spendlove, Yifeng Teng, Di Wang, Hanrui Zhang, Mingfei Zhao, Wennan Zhu, Song Zuo\",\"doi\":\"arxiv-2408.07685\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In this survey, we summarize recent developments in research fueled by the\\ngrowing adoption of automated bidding strategies in online advertising. We\\nexplore the challenges and opportunities that have arisen as markets embrace\\nthis autobidding and cover a range of topics in this area, including bidding\\nalgorithms, equilibrium analysis and efficiency of common auction formats, and\\noptimal auction design.\",\"PeriodicalId\":501316,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory\",\"volume\":\"164 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-08-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.07685\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.07685","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Auto-bidding and Auctions in Online Advertising: A Survey
In this survey, we summarize recent developments in research fueled by the
growing adoption of automated bidding strategies in online advertising. We
explore the challenges and opportunities that have arisen as markets embrace
this autobidding and cover a range of topics in this area, including bidding
algorithms, equilibrium analysis and efficiency of common auction formats, and
optimal auction design.