展示广告的成本控制:理论与实践

Anoop R Katti, Rui C. Gonçalves, Rinchin Iakovlev
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在展示广告中,广告商希望在预算和每次成果成本的约束下实现营销目标。这通常被表述为一个在约束条件下最大化总效用的优化问题。优化是在对偶空间中以在线方式进行的--对于即将进行的广告拍卖,使用最优出价公式出价,同时假设对偶变量为最优值;根据之前的拍卖结果,以在线方式更新对偶变量。虽然这种方法在理论上是合理的,但在实践中,对偶变量并不是一开始就是最优的,而是随着时间的推移逐渐收敛的。具体来说,对于成本约束,收敛是渐进的。因此,我们发现成本控制是无效的。在这项工作中,我们分析了最优投标公式的缺点,并提出了一种偏离理论推导的修改方案。我们模拟了各种实际场景,研究了两种算法的成本控制行为。通过对实词数据的大规模评估,我们发现所提出的修改方案将违规成本降低了 50%,从而实现了比理论竞价公式更好的成本控制效果。
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Cost-Control in Display Advertising: Theory vs Practice
In display advertising, advertisers want to achieve a marketing objective with constraints on budget and cost-per-outcome. This is usually formulated as an optimization problem that maximizes the total utility under constraints. The optimization is carried out in an online fashion in the dual space - for an incoming Ad auction, a bid is placed using an optimal bidding formula, assuming optimal values for the dual variables; based on the outcome of the previous auctions, the dual variables are updated in an online fashion. While this approach is theoretically sound, in practice, the dual variables are not optimal from the beginning, but rather converge over time. Specifically, for the cost-constraint, the convergence is asymptotic. As a result, we find that cost-control is ineffective. In this work, we analyse the shortcomings of the optimal bidding formula and propose a modification that deviates from the theoretical derivation. We simulate various practical scenarios and study the cost-control behaviors of the two algorithms. Through a large-scale evaluation on the real-word data, we show that the proposed modification reduces the cost violations by 50%, thereby achieving a better cost-control than the theoretical bidding formula.
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