董事会偏见、信息和投资效率

IF 4.8 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Review of Accounting Studies Pub Date : 2024-08-15 DOI:10.1007/s11142-024-09853-5
Martin Gregor, Beatrice Michaeli
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们发现了公司治理中偏好不一致的好处背后的一种新力量。我们的模型要求首席执行官遇到一个项目,并在收集信息后决定是否寻求公司董事会的批准。首席执行官可以选择所收集信息的属性--如果项目是 "新颖的",即探索一种新技术、新商业理念或新市场,而董事对其了解较少,就可能出现这种情况。我们发现,只有足够保守和谨慎扩张的董事才能约束首席执行官的帝国建设倾向和机会主义信息收集行为。然而,这样的董事对不新颖的项目投资不足。能实现公司价值最大化的董事会要么保守,要么中立(与股东利益一致),而且总是对创新项目进行过度投资。拥有更多专业知识的董事会更有可能是保守的,但其偏向性没那么严重。董事会的承诺力和偏见是相互替代的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

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Board bias, information, and investment efficiency

We identify a novel force behind the benefit of misaligned preferences in corporate governance. Our model entails a CEO who encounters a project and, after gathering information, decides whether to seek the approval of a corporate board. The CEO may be able to choose the properties of the collected information—this may happen if the project is “novel,” i.e., explores a new technology, business concept, or market and directors are less knowledgeable about it. We find that only sufficiently conservative and expansion-cautious directors can discipline the CEO’s empire-building tendency and opportunistic information collection. Such directors, however, underinvest in projects that are not novel. The board that maximizes firm value is either conservative or neutral (has interests aligned with the shareholders) and always overinvests in innovations. Boards with greater expertise are more likely to be conservative, but their bias is less severe. The board’s commitment power and bias are substitutes.

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来源期刊
Review of Accounting Studies
Review of Accounting Studies BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
7.90
自引率
7.10%
发文量
82
期刊介绍: Review of Accounting Studies provides an outlet for significant academic research in accounting including theoretical, empirical, and experimental work. The journal is committed to the principle that distinctive scholarship is rigorous. While the editors encourage all forms of research, it must contribute to the discipline of accounting. The Review of Accounting Studies is committed to prompt turnaround on the manuscripts it receives.  For the majority of manuscripts the journal will make an accept-reject decision on the first round.  Authors will be provided the opportunity to revise accepted manuscripts in response to reviewer and editor comments; however, discretion over such manuscripts resides principally with the authors.  An editorial revise and resubmit decision is reserved for new submissions which are not acceptable in their current version, but for which the editor sees a clear path of changes which would make the manuscript publishable. Officially cited as: Rev Account Stud
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