有限地平线零和随机博弈中的恒定回报特性

Thomas Ragel, Bruno Ziliotto
{"title":"有限地平线零和随机博弈中的恒定回报特性","authors":"Thomas Ragel, Bruno Ziliotto","doi":"arxiv-2409.05683","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines finite zero-sum stochastic games and demonstrates that\nwhen the game's duration is sufficiently long, there exists a pair of\napproximately optimal strategies such that the expected average payoff at any\npoint in the game remains close to the value. This property, known as the\n\\textit{constant payoff property}, was previously established only for\nabsorbing games and discounted stochastic games.","PeriodicalId":501286,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - MATH - Optimization and Control","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Constant Payoff Property in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with a Finite Horizon\",\"authors\":\"Thomas Ragel, Bruno Ziliotto\",\"doi\":\"arxiv-2409.05683\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper examines finite zero-sum stochastic games and demonstrates that\\nwhen the game's duration is sufficiently long, there exists a pair of\\napproximately optimal strategies such that the expected average payoff at any\\npoint in the game remains close to the value. This property, known as the\\n\\\\textit{constant payoff property}, was previously established only for\\nabsorbing games and discounted stochastic games.\",\"PeriodicalId\":501286,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"arXiv - MATH - Optimization and Control\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"arXiv - MATH - Optimization and Control\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.05683\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv - MATH - Optimization and Control","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2409.05683","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究了有限零和随机博弈,并证明当博弈持续时间足够长时,存在一对近似最优的策略,使得博弈中任何一点的期望平均报酬都保持在接近值的水平。这一性质被称为 "不变报酬性质"(the/textit{constant payoff property}),以前只在吸收博弈和贴现随机博弈中被证实。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Constant Payoff Property in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with a Finite Horizon
This paper examines finite zero-sum stochastic games and demonstrates that when the game's duration is sufficiently long, there exists a pair of approximately optimal strategies such that the expected average payoff at any point in the game remains close to the value. This property, known as the \textit{constant payoff property}, was previously established only for absorbing games and discounted stochastic games.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Trading with propagators and constraints: applications to optimal execution and battery storage Upgrading edges in the maximal covering location problem Minmax regret maximal covering location problems with edge demands Parametric Shape Optimization of Flagellated Micro-Swimmers Using Bayesian Techniques Rapid and finite-time boundary stabilization of a KdV system
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1