Mohammad Akbarzadeh Sarabi, Ata Allah Taleizadeh, Fariborz Jolai
{"title":"盈利途径:揭示网络零售商-制造商供应链中的销售策略和合谋影响","authors":"Mohammad Akbarzadeh Sarabi, Ata Allah Taleizadeh, Fariborz Jolai","doi":"10.1007/s10479-024-06220-0","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Today, as market competition intensifies and competition costs rise, manufacturers are increasingly incentivized to engage in anti-competitive contracts or collusion, disrupting the market and harming non-colluding members; on top of all, the growing dominance of e-tailers further complicates supply chain relationships. While addressing the research gap in the specific dynamics between e-tailers and multiple manufacturers in the context of collusion and competition, the principal objective of this article is to get the best sales strategies and decision-making methods according to the standpoint of manufacturers, the e-tailer, and the entire supply chain. This study investigates the relationships and decisions of supply chain members, including an online retailer (e-tailer) and two manufacturers. Our findings indicate that fines for manufacturer collusion and higher e-tailer referral fees can reduce collusion incentives in reselling formats. When both manufacturers sell their products in a reselling sale format, the overall supply chain profit is appreciably higher in all cases, including centralized decision-making, Stackelberg-Bertrand competition, collusion, and deviation. Additionally, different sales formats increase collusion likelihood compared to identical formats, though reselling formats make collusion more sustainable. E-tailers should invest in high-intensity services to boost profitability, while manufacturers prioritize the agency sale format for optimal profits. The findings of this paper are significant as they provide practical guidance for supply chain management and help in monitoring commercial behavior to prevent collusion.</p>","PeriodicalId":8215,"journal":{"name":"Annals of Operations Research","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Profitable pathways: unraveling sales strategies and collusion impact in e-tailer-manufacturer supply chains\",\"authors\":\"Mohammad Akbarzadeh Sarabi, Ata Allah Taleizadeh, Fariborz Jolai\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s10479-024-06220-0\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>Today, as market competition intensifies and competition costs rise, manufacturers are increasingly incentivized to engage in anti-competitive contracts or collusion, disrupting the market and harming non-colluding members; on top of all, the growing dominance of e-tailers further complicates supply chain relationships. While addressing the research gap in the specific dynamics between e-tailers and multiple manufacturers in the context of collusion and competition, the principal objective of this article is to get the best sales strategies and decision-making methods according to the standpoint of manufacturers, the e-tailer, and the entire supply chain. This study investigates the relationships and decisions of supply chain members, including an online retailer (e-tailer) and two manufacturers. Our findings indicate that fines for manufacturer collusion and higher e-tailer referral fees can reduce collusion incentives in reselling formats. When both manufacturers sell their products in a reselling sale format, the overall supply chain profit is appreciably higher in all cases, including centralized decision-making, Stackelberg-Bertrand competition, collusion, and deviation. Additionally, different sales formats increase collusion likelihood compared to identical formats, though reselling formats make collusion more sustainable. E-tailers should invest in high-intensity services to boost profitability, while manufacturers prioritize the agency sale format for optimal profits. The findings of this paper are significant as they provide practical guidance for supply chain management and help in monitoring commercial behavior to prevent collusion.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":8215,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Annals of Operations Research\",\"volume\":\"27 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-08-29\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Annals of Operations Research\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-024-06220-0\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Annals of Operations Research","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-024-06220-0","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Profitable pathways: unraveling sales strategies and collusion impact in e-tailer-manufacturer supply chains
Today, as market competition intensifies and competition costs rise, manufacturers are increasingly incentivized to engage in anti-competitive contracts or collusion, disrupting the market and harming non-colluding members; on top of all, the growing dominance of e-tailers further complicates supply chain relationships. While addressing the research gap in the specific dynamics between e-tailers and multiple manufacturers in the context of collusion and competition, the principal objective of this article is to get the best sales strategies and decision-making methods according to the standpoint of manufacturers, the e-tailer, and the entire supply chain. This study investigates the relationships and decisions of supply chain members, including an online retailer (e-tailer) and two manufacturers. Our findings indicate that fines for manufacturer collusion and higher e-tailer referral fees can reduce collusion incentives in reselling formats. When both manufacturers sell their products in a reselling sale format, the overall supply chain profit is appreciably higher in all cases, including centralized decision-making, Stackelberg-Bertrand competition, collusion, and deviation. Additionally, different sales formats increase collusion likelihood compared to identical formats, though reselling formats make collusion more sustainable. E-tailers should invest in high-intensity services to boost profitability, while manufacturers prioritize the agency sale format for optimal profits. The findings of this paper are significant as they provide practical guidance for supply chain management and help in monitoring commercial behavior to prevent collusion.
期刊介绍:
The Annals of Operations Research publishes peer-reviewed original articles dealing with key aspects of operations research, including theory, practice, and computation. The journal publishes full-length research articles, short notes, expositions and surveys, reports on computational studies, and case studies that present new and innovative practical applications.
In addition to regular issues, the journal publishes periodic special volumes that focus on defined fields of operations research, ranging from the highly theoretical to the algorithmic and the applied. These volumes have one or more Guest Editors who are responsible for collecting the papers and overseeing the refereeing process.