Mathias Fridahl, Kenneth Möllersten, Liv Lundberg, Wilfried Rickels
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Based on 35 interviews with experts in the latent BECCS sector in Sweden, we identify under which circumstances prospective operators would be willing to place bids and discuss how actor preferences both align with and challenge auction theory. The analysis concludes that at least four dilemmas need attention. These concerns how to: (1) balance the state’s demand for BECCS to be implemented already in 2030 against the prospective BECCS operators’ fear of the winner’s curse, i.e., a fear of bidding for a contract that turns out to be too costly to implement; (2) allocate contracts at the margin of the auctioneer’s demand for BECCS without driving up costs; (3) design compliance mechanism to achieve effectiveness without undermining efficiency, and; 4) integrate the auction with the voluntary carbon market—if at all—in a manner that safeguards the environmental integrity of the auctions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":546,"journal":{"name":"Environmental Sciences Europe","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1186/s12302-024-00971-0.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Potential and goal conflicts in reverse auction design for bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS)\",\"authors\":\"Mathias Fridahl, Kenneth Möllersten, Liv Lundberg, Wilfried Rickels\",\"doi\":\"10.1186/s12302-024-00971-0\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) is considered as a future key technology to provide baseload electricity, heat, pulp, paper, and biofuels, while also enabling atmospheric carbon dioxide removal (CDR). Sweden seeks to lead the way in bringing this technology up to scale, introducing a EUR 3.6 billion reverse auction scheme to facilitate market entry of companies producing BECCS. We explore instrument design preferences among politicians, regulators, and prospective BECCS operators to identify trade-offs and explore feasible policy design. Based on 35 interviews with experts in the latent BECCS sector in Sweden, we identify under which circumstances prospective operators would be willing to place bids and discuss how actor preferences both align with and challenge auction theory. The analysis concludes that at least four dilemmas need attention. These concerns how to: (1) balance the state’s demand for BECCS to be implemented already in 2030 against the prospective BECCS operators’ fear of the winner’s curse, i.e., a fear of bidding for a contract that turns out to be too costly to implement; (2) allocate contracts at the margin of the auctioneer’s demand for BECCS without driving up costs; (3) design compliance mechanism to achieve effectiveness without undermining efficiency, and; 4) integrate the auction with the voluntary carbon market—if at all—in a manner that safeguards the environmental integrity of the auctions.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":546,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Environmental Sciences Europe\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":6.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-08-16\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1186/s12302-024-00971-0.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Environmental Sciences Europe\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"93\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s12302-024-00971-0\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"环境科学与生态学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Environmental Sciences Europe","FirstCategoryId":"93","ListUrlMain":"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s12302-024-00971-0","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"环境科学与生态学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES","Score":null,"Total":0}
Potential and goal conflicts in reverse auction design for bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS)
Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) is considered as a future key technology to provide baseload electricity, heat, pulp, paper, and biofuels, while also enabling atmospheric carbon dioxide removal (CDR). Sweden seeks to lead the way in bringing this technology up to scale, introducing a EUR 3.6 billion reverse auction scheme to facilitate market entry of companies producing BECCS. We explore instrument design preferences among politicians, regulators, and prospective BECCS operators to identify trade-offs and explore feasible policy design. Based on 35 interviews with experts in the latent BECCS sector in Sweden, we identify under which circumstances prospective operators would be willing to place bids and discuss how actor preferences both align with and challenge auction theory. The analysis concludes that at least four dilemmas need attention. These concerns how to: (1) balance the state’s demand for BECCS to be implemented already in 2030 against the prospective BECCS operators’ fear of the winner’s curse, i.e., a fear of bidding for a contract that turns out to be too costly to implement; (2) allocate contracts at the margin of the auctioneer’s demand for BECCS without driving up costs; (3) design compliance mechanism to achieve effectiveness without undermining efficiency, and; 4) integrate the auction with the voluntary carbon market—if at all—in a manner that safeguards the environmental integrity of the auctions.
期刊介绍:
ESEU is an international journal, focusing primarily on Europe, with a broad scope covering all aspects of environmental sciences, including the main topic regulation.
ESEU will discuss the entanglement between environmental sciences and regulation because, in recent years, there have been misunderstandings and even disagreement between stakeholders in these two areas. ESEU will help to improve the comprehension of issues between environmental sciences and regulation.
ESEU will be an outlet from the German-speaking (DACH) countries to Europe and an inlet from Europe to the DACH countries regarding environmental sciences and regulation.
Moreover, ESEU will facilitate the exchange of ideas and interaction between Europe and the DACH countries regarding environmental regulatory issues.
Although Europe is at the center of ESEU, the journal will not exclude the rest of the world, because regulatory issues pertaining to environmental sciences can be fully seen only from a global perspective.