生物能源与碳捕集与封存(BECCS)反向拍卖设计中的潜在冲突和目标冲突

IF 6 3区 环境科学与生态学 Q1 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES Environmental Sciences Europe Pub Date : 2024-08-16 DOI:10.1186/s12302-024-00971-0
Mathias Fridahl, Kenneth Möllersten, Liv Lundberg, Wilfried Rickels
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摘要

碳捕集与封存生物能源(BECCS)被认为是未来提供基荷电力、热能、纸浆、造纸和生物燃料的关键技术,同时还能去除大气中的二氧化碳(CDR)。瑞典力图引领这项技术的规模化发展,推出了一项 36 亿欧元的反向拍卖计划,以促进生产 BECCS 的公司进入市场。我们探讨了政治家、监管者和潜在的 BECCS 运营商对工具设计的偏好,以确定权衡并探索可行的政策设计。基于对瑞典潜在 BECCS 行业专家的 35 次访谈,我们确定了潜在运营商在哪些情况下愿意出价,并讨论了行为者的偏好如何与拍卖理论相一致并对其提出挑战。分析得出的结论是,至少有四个难题需要关注。这些问题涉及如何(1) 平衡国家对 BECCS 在 2030 年实施的要求与潜在 BECCS 运营商对赢家诅咒的恐惧,即对竞标合同的恐惧、2)在不增加成本的前提下,根据拍卖者对 BECCS 的需求来分配合同;(3)设计履约机制,在不影响效率的前提下实现有效性;以及(4)将拍卖与自愿碳市场相结合--如果能够保证拍卖的环境完整性的话。
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Potential and goal conflicts in reverse auction design for bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS)

Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) is considered as a future key technology to provide baseload electricity, heat, pulp, paper, and biofuels, while also enabling atmospheric carbon dioxide removal (CDR). Sweden seeks to lead the way in bringing this technology up to scale, introducing a EUR 3.6 billion reverse auction scheme to facilitate market entry of companies producing BECCS. We explore instrument design preferences among politicians, regulators, and prospective BECCS operators to identify trade-offs and explore feasible policy design. Based on 35 interviews with experts in the latent BECCS sector in Sweden, we identify under which circumstances prospective operators would be willing to place bids and discuss how actor preferences both align with and challenge auction theory. The analysis concludes that at least four dilemmas need attention. These concerns how to: (1) balance the state’s demand for BECCS to be implemented already in 2030 against the prospective BECCS operators’ fear of the winner’s curse, i.e., a fear of bidding for a contract that turns out to be too costly to implement; (2) allocate contracts at the margin of the auctioneer’s demand for BECCS without driving up costs; (3) design compliance mechanism to achieve effectiveness without undermining efficiency, and; 4) integrate the auction with the voluntary carbon market—if at all—in a manner that safeguards the environmental integrity of the auctions.

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来源期刊
Environmental Sciences Europe
Environmental Sciences Europe Environmental Science-Pollution
CiteScore
11.20
自引率
1.70%
发文量
110
审稿时长
13 weeks
期刊介绍: ESEU is an international journal, focusing primarily on Europe, with a broad scope covering all aspects of environmental sciences, including the main topic regulation. ESEU will discuss the entanglement between environmental sciences and regulation because, in recent years, there have been misunderstandings and even disagreement between stakeholders in these two areas. ESEU will help to improve the comprehension of issues between environmental sciences and regulation. ESEU will be an outlet from the German-speaking (DACH) countries to Europe and an inlet from Europe to the DACH countries regarding environmental sciences and regulation. Moreover, ESEU will facilitate the exchange of ideas and interaction between Europe and the DACH countries regarding environmental regulatory issues. Although Europe is at the center of ESEU, the journal will not exclude the rest of the world, because regulatory issues pertaining to environmental sciences can be fully seen only from a global perspective.
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